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1553 
Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, 
Intimates, and Social Institutional 
Reform 
Allegra M. McLeod* 
The criminal regulation of sexual harm in the United States is 
afflicted by deep pathology. Although sexual harm appears before the 
law in a variety of forms—from violent rape, to indecent exposure, to 
the sexual touching by an older child of a younger child—the 
prevailing U.S. criminal regulatory framework responds to this wide 
range of conduct with remarkable uniformity. All persons so 
convicted are labeled “sex offenders,” and most are subjected to 
registration, community notification, and residential restrictions, 
among other sanctions. These measures purport to prevent the 
perpetration of further criminal sexual harm by publicizing the 
identities and restricting the residential opportunities of persons 
presumed to be strangers to their victims. But even as these measures 
render many subject to them homeless and unemployable, sexual 
abuse remains pervasive and significantly underreported in our 
schools, prisons, military, and between intimates in families. Thus, at 
once, the U.S. criminal regulatory regime constructs a peculiarly 
overbroad category of feared persons, compels a misguided 
approach to this population, and neglects the most prevalent forms of 
vulnerability to sexual predation and assault. This Essay argues that 
an alternative social institutional reform framework could address 
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pervasive forms of sexual harm more meaningfully and with fewer 
problems than attend the prevailing criminal regulatory framework. 
This alternative framework would depart in large measure from 
purportedly preventive post-conviction criminal regulation, focusing 
instead on institutional, structural, and social dynamics that enable 
sexual violence and abuse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even though most sexual abuse occurs between persons known to one 
another,1 the U.S. criminal regulatory regime addressing criminal sexual harm 
focuses largely on convicted sex offenders presumed to be strangers to their 
intended victims.2 While rape law reform is widely celebrated as an important 
feminist success,3 this reform represents only a minor component of a much 
 
1.  Less than 7 percent of sex crimes against all juveniles are committed by strangers. See 
HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT 
OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000). Approximately 75 percent of sex crimes involving adult victims are 
perpetrated by known assailants. See RICHARD TEWKSBURY & JILL LEVENSON, WHEN EVIDENCE IS 
IGNORED: RESIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS FOR SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2008).  
2. See, e.g., CHRYSANTHI S. LEON, SEX FIENDS, PERVERTS, AND PEDOPHILES: 
UNDERSTANDING SEX CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA (2011); LAURA J. ZILNEY & LISA ANNE ZILNEY, 
PERVERTS & PREDATORS: THE MAKING OF SEXUAL OFFENDING LAWS 118–19 (2009). 
3. See, e.g., MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA: FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 195 (2000) (noting among the successes of the feminist anti-rape movement 
“reforms in criminal law, gains in funding for rape research and service providers, institutional reform 
on the local level, and passage of the Violence Against Women Act” and that “[b]y any measure, the 
effectiveness of the anti-rape campaign cannot be denied.”); KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE 
STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 1 (2008) (“For almost forty years a concerted campaign by feminists has transformed 
popular consciousness and led to the widespread growth of organizations designed to address the 
problem of sexual violence.”); Victoria Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and Failures of Feminism 
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broader transformation in the criminal regulation of sexual offending at the end 
of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries.4 Sexual assault 
legislative reform has been accompanied too by an array of hyper-punitive and 
largely ineffective post-conviction responses to sexual violence and abuse. In 
1994, the year that the anti-rape movement won an important victory with the 
passage of the Violence Against Women Act (which appropriates funds for the 
prosecution of violent crimes against women), the U.S. Congress also passed 
legislation requiring states to implement sex offender registries.5 Subsequently, 
with federal encouragement, jurisdictions across the United States have adopted 
sex offender registration, notification, and residency restriction laws—widely 
publicizing the identities of persons with sex offense convictions and 
prohibiting these persons from residing, and sometimes working or loitering, 
within a specified limited distance of parks, schools, bus stops, or other places 
where children may congregate.6 These responses fundamentally neglect the 
feminist critique of sexual assault regulation that motivated substantive 
criminal law reform efforts in the first instance, particularly the pervasiveness 
of unredressed sexual violence and abuse between intimates.7 Why, then, this 
predominant focus on registering and banishing stranger convicted offenders 
when the vast majority of sexual harm involves unreported violence and abuse 
between intimates? 
The project of physically banishing and publicizing the identities of 
presumably sexually dangerous strangers, and on occasion indefinitely civilly 
confining these individuals, is often justified as a measure to prevent future 
sexual harm.8 These laws were almost all enacted in the wake of vicious rape-
 
and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951, 951 (2000) (“There is not a criminal law casebook 
in America today, nor a state statute book, that does not tell this story.”). 
4. See, e.g., ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF 
SUCCESS 3–4 (2013) (“[A]ssumption[s] about the unalloyed success of the feminist rape law reform 
project [are] . . . profoundly misguided”).  
5. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–73 (2012). 
6. See, e.g., LEON, supra note 2; SANDRA NORMAN-EADY, SEX OFFENDERS’ RESIDENCY 
RESTRICTIONS 1–2 (2007). 
7. See CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 4–5; LEON, supra note 2; see also STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 10 
(1998) (“Opponents of rape reform have managed to convince a wide audience that standards of 
permissible conduct are now dictated by ‘hypersensitive’ young women and by ‘radical’ feminists 
committed to a highly restrictive, Victorian conception of sexual propriety. . . . The reality is far 
different. The claim that legal rules, campus behavior codes, and company policies enshrine radically 
overprotective, puritanical rules of conduct is a myth.”); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: 
Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1256 
(2009) (“Historically, criminal law and family law have worked in tandem to produce a binary view of 
intimate life that categorizes intimate acts and choices as either legitimate marital behavior or 
illegitimate criminal behavior.”). 
8. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications 
and Limits, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 542 (2012). 
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kidnapping murders with the aim of bringing perpetrators to law enforcement’s 
and communities’ attention before they could harm others again.9 
Yet, widespread sexual assault remains in U.S. military programs,10 in the 
nation’s elite colleges and universities,11 in the locker room showers at 
Pennsylvania State University,12 at the hands of the prestigious Horace Mann 
School’s “Prep School Predators,”13 and in prisons,14 parishes15 and families16 
around the country. A significant majority of these rapes and sexual assaults are 
 
 9. See generally LEON, supra note 2. 
10. See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND 
VIOLENCE AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES (2011). 
11. According to the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, one in 
five female students are sexually assaulted in college. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT 
STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK 
FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (2014), available at https://www.not 
alone.gov/assets/report.pdf; see also Richard Pérez-Peña & Kate Taylor, Fight Against Sexual Assaults 
Holds Colleges to Account, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/us/fight 
-against-sex-crimes-holds-colleges-to-account.html?_r=0 (“[A] group of women, identified then only 
by pseudonyms . . . became the talk of Columbia this past winter, when an article in a student 
magazine . . . described in detail their accounts of being sexually assaulted, and their frustrated 
searches for aid and justice from the university.”); Caroline Tan, Frat City?, YALE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 
24, 2012, http://yaledailynews.com/weekend/2012/02/24/frat-city/ (describing fraternity initiation that 
entailed recruits chanting outside freshman dormitories, “No means yes, yes means anal”); Matthew 
Burgoyne, Yale Bans “No Means Yes” Fraternity for Five Years,” MS. MAGAZINE, May 18, 2011, 
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/05/18/yale-bans-no-means-yes-fraternity-for-five-years/; Richard 
Pérez-Peña, Yale Fulfills Vow on Sex-Misconduct Report, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, http://www.ny 
times.com/2012/02/02/nyregion/in-yale-report-52-complaints-of-sexual-misconduct.html; Yale and 
U.S. Resolve Sexual Harassment Claim, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
06/16/nyregion/yale-and-us-resolve-sexual-harassment-claim.html. 
12. See Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/sports/ncaafootball/jerry-sandusky-convicted-of-sexually 
-abusing-boys.html?pagewanted=all. 
13. See Amos Kamil, Prep-School Predators: The Horace Mann School’s Secret History of 
Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/magazine/the-horace 
-mann-schools-secret-history-of-sexual-abuse.html?pagewanted=all. 
14. See, e.g., Christopher Glazek, Raise the Crime Rate, N+1, no. 13, Winter 2012, 
https://nlusonemag.com/issue-13/politics/raise-the-crime-rate/ (“[T]he Justice Department finally 
released an estimate of the prevalence of sexual abuse in penitentiaries. . . . That’s 216,000 victims, not 
instances. These victims are often assaulted multiple times over the course of the year. The Justice 
Department now seems to be saying that prison rape accounted for the majority of all rapes committed 
in the US in 2008.”); see also ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008-09 (2010), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf. 
15.  See Jim Yardley, Pope Asks Forgiveness From Victims of Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2014. 
16. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHILD MALTREATMENT 23 (2010), 
available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf (noting that 81.3 percent of 
child victims of reported maltreatment, including victims of both physical and sexual abuse, are abused 
by a parent). Although a separate statistical analysis of reported incidents of sexual assault of juveniles 
suggested family members perpetrated 34.2 percent of all assaults, there is a particular likelihood of 
underreporting of familial sexual assault due to the close relationship of the victim and the assailant. 
See SNYDER, supra note 1, at 10. 
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never reported to law enforcement.17 Of 100 rapes committed, an estimated 5–
20 are reported to police, 0.4–5.4 are prosecuted, and 0.2–5.2 result in 
conviction.18 Accordingly, as the U.S. criminal regulatory regime governing 
sexual harm concentrates on publicizing, monitoring, and banishing 
presumably dangerous convicted strangers, most sexual violence goes 
unaddressed.19  
At the same time, the registries and residential restrictions construct an 
extraordinarily broad identity category—sex offender—out of disparate and 
largely unrelated forms of sexual harm ranging from violent rape, to child 
pornography, to sexual touching by an older child of a younger child, to 
indecent exposure. Even though the looming figure of the stranger-child-
kidnapper-rapist motivated enactment of the governing statutory framework, 
many individuals are subject to this regime after being convicted of 
significantly less heinous conduct, including offenses as minor as public 
urination or sex with an underage individual when the age difference between 
the parties is small and the sex is otherwise consensual.20 
In fact, rather than prevent repeat criminal conduct, post-conviction sex 
offense regulation may actually be criminogenic.21 Residency restrictions often 
render those subject to them unemployable, homeless, and at risk of harassment 
or even lethal violence.22 In these respects, persons labeled sex offenders are 
 
17. See LYNN LANGTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SPECIAL REPORT: VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006-2010, at 4 (2012). 
18. See Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual 
Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 
157 (2012). 
19. See Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty 
Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 472 (2005) (“[R]ape is the least reported, 
least indicted, and least convicted non-property felony in America.”); ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, 
at xiv (“[M]ost sexual violations occur between people who are known or related to one another.”); 
ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE 
PREVENTIVE STATE 46 (2006) (“About 69 percent of female victims of rape were victimized by 
someone known to them. . . . Despite the ubiquity of sexual assault, a substantial proportion of sexual 
abuse is never reported to law enforcement authorities.”); see also infra Part I. 
20. See, e.g., LEON, supra note 2, at 179–80 (discussing the cases of Ryan Johnson, who 
became a convicted sex offender after a citation for public urination that occurred when the toilets at 
his jobsite were occupied, and Genarlow Wilson, who spent two years in prison and was required to 
register as a sex offender after being convicted for having consensual oral sex when he was seventeen 
with a fifteen-year-old girl). The proportion of more-serious to less-serious sex-related convictions is 
unknown because there is not composite information available that captures the content of the conduct 
underlying convictions across multiple jurisdictions. 
21. See J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws 
Affect Criminal Behavior, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 161–65 (2011) (arguing that “notification may 
actually increase recidivism” and that “convicted sex offenders become more likely to commit crimes 
when their information is made public because the associated psychological, social, or financial costs 
make crime-free life relatively less attractive”). 
22. See, e.g., HUMAN RTS. WATCH, RAISED ON THE REGISTRY: THE IRREPARABLE HARM OF 
PLACING CHILDREN ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES IN THE US 47 (2013) [hereinafter RAISED ON THE 
REGISTRY]. 
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managed in ways that call the legal system into disrepute, quite possibly 
exacerbating rather than ameliorating relevant harms.23 These problems are 
especially stark in cases involving persons convicted of minor offenses, such as 
indecent exposure or statutory rape, but the cruelty of various collateral 
sanctions is unjust and counterproductive even in the smaller number of cases 
involving persons convicted of very serious offenses. 
Further, while registries and residential restrictions offer uncertain, if any, 
preventative effect against recidivism, most new convictions for sexual crimes 
involve individuals who are not registered sex offenders.24 This incongruity 
between new convictions and existing sex offender registries undermines the 
assumptions that drive registration—namely that registration will enable quick 
identification of sexual perpetrators and allow law enforcement to monitor 
those persons most likely to sexually offend and recidivate. It is unlikely that 
the mismatch between new convictions and individuals on the registry is due to 
the fact that registration so effectively prevents what would otherwise be 
rampant offending by this population.25 
Moreover, these criminal regulatory interventions do not improve the 
handling of sexual assault from the standpoint of survivors of sexual violence: 
rape remains vastly undereported at least in significant part because of the ill fit 
between the needs of survivors and the actual administration of the criminal 
legal process. Notwithstanding reform to rape statutes, a recent multi-
jurisdictional qualitative empirical study of reporting and charging practices 
reflects: 
Police are reluctant to take reports, dismissive of the seriousness of 
rape, and refuse to investigate cases based on the socio-economic 
positions of the victims and/or alleged assailant. Prosecutors routinely 
 
23. See id. 
24. See, e.g., Alissa R. Ackerman et al., Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? A 
Descriptive Analysis of Individuals on Public Sex Offender Registries, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 
149 (2011) (examining the heterogeneity of the population of registered sex offenders); Kelly K. 
Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 412, 414 (2010) (reporting that 96 percent of all new arrests for sexual crimes in New 
York occurred among those without previous sexual crime convictions). 
25. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?, REGULATION, 
Summer 2012, at 48, 50–55 (exploring the various possible deterrent and criminogenic effects of sex 
offender registration and notification laws). Prescott concludes:  
[T]he idea that notification regimes may make registered offenders more dangerous is 
consistent with the fact that notification causes these individuals significant financial, social, 
and psychological harm. . . . [There is] no evidence . . . that the threat of registration alone 
deters individuals from engaging in sex crime. . . . [I]f these laws impose significant 
burdens on a large share of former offenders, and if only a limited number of potential 
victims benefit from knowing who and where sex offenders are, then we should not be 
surprised to observe more recidivism under notification, with recidivism rates rising as 
notification expands. 
Id.; see also Bob Edward Vásquez et al., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Laws in the United States, 54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 175, 187 (2006), available at http://cad.sage 
pub.com/content/54/2/175 (Results do not “offer a clear or unidirectional conclusion as to whether sex 
offender notification laws reduce rapes.”). 
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and systematically decline to charge cases that they deem 
“difficult.” . . . Law enforcement officials offer endless reasons why 
rape allegations are not pursued: victims are described as too old or too 
young, too drunk or not drunk enough, too sexually experienced or too 
naïve. These attitudes and practices are not only present in “tough” 
cases such as rapes between acquaintances that hinge on consent rather 
than the presence of externally visible violence. They are seen in cases 
from across the spectrum of sexual assault: those involving strangers, 
family members, and intimate partners; cases involving victims of all 
ages; assaults involving coercion ranging from verbal threats to near-
homicides.26 
For these reasons, survivors do not generally perceive the criminal process as 
one that will offer them meaningful protection or repair.27 
The extraordinarily punitive character of post-conviction sex offense 
regulations also makes survivors who have close personal or familial ties to 
their assailants reluctant to report not only out of fear or shame but because 
criminal conviction consequences that amount to permanent banishment are 
often undesirable between intimates (as opposed, perhaps, as applied to 
strangers).28 Registration and notification measures create particularly strong 
disincentives to report among family members.29  
The prevailing regulatory framework thus produces an irrationally 
configured, overbroad category of persons—registered sex offenders—and 
widespread fear of such persons, as well as draconian responses to this 
population. As it both over-criminalizes and over-punishes, this regime 
neglects the varied array of other, more specific structural and institutional 
reformist responses that might better address the reality of sexual harm between 
 
26. See CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 4 (relating results of “interviews with 167 rape care 
advocates . . . working at 112 local [Rape Crisis Centers] in six states across the country: Colorado, 
Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Washington”). 
27. See id.; see also Seidman & Vickers, supra note 19, at 472. Survivors routinely encounter 
a criminal regulatory regime “poorly equipped to protect against the immediate devastating 
consequences of assault.” See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 19, at 472. 
28.  According to one rape crisis advocate, “[P]art of the reason these cases don’t get 
prosecuted is also—and I worked with [local college students] for . . . years . . . —they don’t want to 
see them in orange overalls. They just want him to understand what he did and to learn how not to do it 
again.” CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 220–21; see also JOYCE ALLAN, BECAUSE I LOVE YOU: THE 
SILENT SHADOW OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 311 (2002) (examining Allan’s own experience as an 
adult survivor of child sexual abuse by her father and the deep ambivalence and ultimate rejection of 
criminal consequences as a response to her and her family’s abuse: “[M]y father was both victim and 
offender. Not either-or. Not black-white. Not good-bad”); see also Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice’s 
Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 776 (2014) (examining how 
the adversarial criminal process “exacts severe costs” on “victim-witnesses, especially in cases of 
traumatic crimes of sexual assault”). 
29.  As another rape crisis advocate explained, “[t]he majority of the women and men and 
children who we treat in our program are victims of . . . somebody in the family or someone close to 
the family. I think there are a million reasons why people don’t report anyway and [reporting and 
registration requirements are] one more to add to it.” CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 220–21. 
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intimates in our central social institutions, as well as the needs of survivors of 
sexual harm. 
The use of the term “sexual harm” rather than “sexual violence” or 
“sexual abuse” in this Essay’s title intends both to capture the overbreadth of 
the category “sex offender” and to focus attention on the actual behaviors and 
institutions that cause people to suffer harm, including criminal sex offense 
regulatory measures themselves. The core argument in the pages to follow is 
that if our aim is to reduce sexual harm and enable just, compassionate 
response to sexual violence and abuse, regulation ought to shift in large 
measure from supposedly preventive targeting of convicted sex offenders to a 
social institutional reform framework. Relatedly, specifying the “correct” 
content of the substantive criminal law of rape, which has occupied so much of 
the legal scholarship focused on sexual harm, will do little to address the 
broader problems of unredressed sexual violence, rape, and abuse.30 Instead, a 
social institutional reform framework would expand the stakes and politics of 
regulating sexual harm to incorporate values of sex and gender equality, 
freedom, and pleasure rather than narrowing a reformist focus to the scope of 
what the substantive criminal law ought to or might most efficiently punish. 
A social institutional reform framework would likewise shift from 
primarily scapegoating stranger predators to grappling with the difficult and 
painful role sexual harm plays in our most central social institutions and 
between intimates. René Girard, the anthropologist and literary critic, 
developed a theory of the “Scapegoat Mechanism” in a series of works 
culminating in a book entitled The Scapegoat.31 Girard’s account illuminates 
some of the social resonance of the prevailing sex offense regulatory regime, 
which relies heavily on delimiting a broad scope of offending conduct and then 
scapegoating stranger sexual predators through various often-draconian post-
conviction punitive “collateral” consequences.32 The resonance of the status 
quo sex offense regulatory regime remains relevant to any reformist effort to 
confront its excesses. And Girard’s “Scapegoat Mechanism” suggests not a 
causal theory of how the status quo criminal regulatory regime came into being, 
but rather some of the psychosocial forces that contribute to its power and that 
 
30. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual 
Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013) (arguing that rape law’s “much-maligned force requirement 
may not be so malign after all” and against the substantive criminal law’s definition of rape as simply 
“unconsented-to-sex”), with SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 69 (1987) (“[T]he force standard continues 
to protect . . . conduct which should be considered criminal. It ensures broad male freedom to ‘seduce’ 
women who feel themselves to be powerless . . . and afraid . . . [and] to intimidate women and exploit 
their weakness and passivity.”), and SCHULHOFER, supra note 7, at 15 (contending that the 
requirement of force “places an imprimatur of social permission on virtually all pressures and 
inducements that can be considered nonviolent” and therefore “leaves women unprotected against 
forms of pressure that any society should consider morally improper and legally intolerable”).  
31. See RENÉ GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT 14–15, 21–22 (Yvonne Freccero trans., 1986). 
32. See id. 
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must be confronted to bring about its undoing.33 
More specifically, through the scapegoat mechanism Girard describes 
how the profound conflicts in a society that arise from people’s competing 
desires, values, and fears produce the phenomenon of the scapegoat—typically 
a category of persons—singled out as responsible for the problem.34 The 
scapegoat is then targeted and eliminated, or attempts at elimination are 
made.35 The figure of the scapegoat produces psychological relief and a moral 
bond or cohesion through practices of banishment.36 But the effectiveness of 
 
33. As with any complex socio-legal framework, multiple factors contributed to the emergence 
of the prevailing array of statutory restrictions and criminal regulatory practices. The disproportionate 
application of harsh criminal measures to poor dispossessed people of color undoubtedly enables a 
harshness and overbreadth that would be less readily tolerated were it applied on a comparable scale to 
wealthier, more powerful white citizens. Complete and accurate racial and socioeconomic 
demographic data on convicted sex offenders are not readily available, but the disproportionate 
targeting of African Americans and Latinos across the criminal system for arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration has been well documented. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS (2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: 
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). Other significant 
contributing factors almost certainly include intensive media focus on egregious acts of sexual 
violence perpetrated by strangers against young children and elected officials’ inclination to “govern 
through crime.” See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); see also 
Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 452 (1998). Simon posits: 
The new generation of sex offender laws represents a shift toward the new penology 
combined with a strong appeal to populist punitiveness. This takes the form of 
managerialism (i.e., the divorce of institutional objectives from public goals) combined 
with gestures of identification with populist sentiments evoked by sex crimes. The new 
penology is generally agnostic toward treatment. The goal is waste management. Populist 
punitiveness is exceedingly hostile toward medicalization. The result is an important 
transformation of the sex offender from the most obvious example of crime as disease back 
to an earlier conception of crime as monstrosity. Sex offenders are our modern-day 
monsters, producing tidal waves of public demand. 
See id. at 456. Of course, the identification of social, anthropological, and psychological factors that 
contribute to the entrenchment of sex offender regulation is not inconsistent with the fact that these 
contexts are produced by material, political, and historical forces. Rather, the scapegoat mechanism 
underscores social and social-psychological processes that operate in tandem with other political, 
economic, legal, and historical factors.  
34. See, e.g., René Girard, Stereotypes of Persecution, in THE GIRARD READER 107, 109–10. 
35. Even when the scapegoat has committed a heinous act for which he is banished, the 
scapegoat mechanism still proceeds in a manner that attributes blame exclusively to the culprit rather 
than addressing broader causes and deeper sources of violence and unrest. See id. at 115. 
36. More recent social-psychological research has explored in diverse experimental settings 
how the scapegoat hypothesis coheres with other social-psychological processes that contribute to 
maintenance of the status quo, though not with sex offender regulation as a particular focus of study. 
System justification theory, for example, holds that people are motivated to system-justify because 
doing so fulfills particular social and psychological needs, especially by reducing uncertainty (fulfilling 
epistemic needs), neutralizing threat (addressing existential concerns relating to security), and 
promoting conformity (satisfying relational motives towards solidarity). See John T. Jost et al., System 
Justification: How Do We Know It’s Motivated?, in 11 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE AND 
LEGITIMACY 173, 178–80 (D. Ramona Bobocel et al. eds., 2010); John T. Jost & David M. Amodio, 
Political Ideology As Motivated Social Cognition: Behavioral and Neuroscientific Evidence, 36 
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 55, 56 (2011). 
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this banishment is both imagined and real: it is imagined inasmuch as exclusion 
of a scapegoated class does not rid the community of the deeper sources of 
conflict; still, it registers very real effects on the lives and bodies of the 
scapegoats and in the social smoothing, anxiety-relieving results it engenders 
for the polity.37 
Along these lines, then, this Essay will reveal how the prevailing criminal 
regulatory regime applied to persons convicted of sex offenses imagines sexual 
pathology to be located in dangerous strangers, who may be identified through 
often minor deviant behavior (consumption of pornography or public urination) 
and physically excluded from U.S. communities. This reduces collective 
anxiety and uncertainty by purporting to identify those persons likely to 
perpetrate sexual harm. Registration and notification requirements promise to 
publicize the identities of sexually dangerous strangers. Residential restrictions 
promise to remove these persons from our communities. And civil commitment 
statutes promise, where appropriate, to indefinitely civilly detain especially 
dangerous predators. This framework enables a greater sense of perceived 
safety and smoothes relationships in families, schools, churches, and other 
central social institutions, as the locus of any sexual threat is understood to be 
external to these spaces. 
But the identification and attempted banishment of a category of stranger- 
predator sex offenders permit attempted elimination of a scapegoat population 
to substitute for the more disruptive and unsettling yet important and neglected 
work of understanding the pervasiveness of sexual harm within families, 
schools, churches, prisons, and the military. As this banishment approach 
avoids fundamental reform of those institutions, the persistence of sexual harm 
generates pressure for ever more misdirected enforcement. Hence the ultimate 
inefficacy of banishment efforts creates a strong impetus towards expansion of 
sex offense regulatory measures, both as the construct of the scapegoated 
stranger-predator class has become socially embedded and as a cadre of “sex 
offender” regulatory professionals (i.e., specialized probation officers, 
treatment monitors, specialized detention center staff) has emerged to manage 
this class of persons.38 The unfolding of this process reinforces a longstanding 
 
37. Girard’s scapegoat mechanism is an anthropological theory with a strong social-
psychological dimension that accounts for broader practices of seeking to achieve social order through 
banishment. This argument bears an important relationship to but differs from Durkheimian criminal 
law scholars’ accounts of “deep scapegoating,” which emphasize the use of crime policy to produce 
social cohesion in the face of a perceived but largely inchoate threat to the social order; by contrast, my 
analysis posits in the sex offending context a more targeted ostracism of a reviled and vulnerable class 
of persons in part as a means, even if unconscious, to avoid engaging more difficult and pressing forms 
of sexual harm in central social institutions and intimate relationships. See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, 
Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 
829, 830 (2000); The Anthropology of the Cross: A Conversation with René Girard, in THE GIRARD 
READER 262, 266 (James G. Williams ed., 2001). 
38. See infra Part I.D.; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1974-1975, at 308–09 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2003) 
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collective fantasy that renders sexual pathology external to the sexual normalcy 
of conventional family structures and social institutions.39 This false 
appearance of “sexual normalcy” heavily emphasizes dreadful but infrequent 
stranger child-rape-kidnappings, even as ongoing sexual harm is left 
unexamined for the most part, and even as this regulatory regime produces 
other socially ostracizing impacts that may increase rather than decrease 
crime.40 In the midst of these processes, the refinements of the substantive 
criminal law of rape of interest to criminal law scholars have become largely a 
sideshow.41 
In summary, though unlikely to prove effective at countering widespread 
but unreported sexual harm, the scapegoat mechanism as applied to “sex 
offenders” offers psychological relief and social smoothing benefits while it 
neglects the true scope and depth of the very problems it purports to address. In 
particular, this banishment remedy neglects the feminist analysis of rape that 
motivated rape law reform efforts42—above all, the insight that sexual violence 
is normalized and embedded in conceptions of inviolable family privacy, in 
unequal gender relations, and in institutional hierarchies that maintain the 
secrecy, stigma, and shame associated with sexual abuse.43 
Recognizing these problems as well as the inefficacy and excessive 
harshness of current regulations directed at sexual harm, advocates in particular 
jurisdictions have begun to call attention to the overbreadth and dysfunction of 
 
(exploring how a class of psychiatric professionals simultaneously constituted their professional power 
(“medically qualified power”) and constituted new categories of normative development and mental 
alienation or illness). 
39. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 7; see also VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA (1955) (criticizing, 
in the form of a novel, the fantasy that the home is a special preserve of upstanding morality by 
rendering the dangerous stranger as a father). 
40. The attachment to stranger-danger within the status quo criminal regulatory regime 
addressing sex offenses is also consistent with the tendency illuminated in the behavioral economics 
literature to overemphasize catastrophic but unlikely risks relative to more likely but less dramatically 
harmful outcomes. People tend toward a more pronounced fear of airplane accidents relative to car 
accidents, for example, and by extension perhaps a more pronounced fear of stranger kidnapping and 
rape of children than of sexual abuse at home or in church or school. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002). 
41. See generally CORRIGAN, supra note 4 (examining how changes in the substantive 
criminal law of rape are largely overwhelmed by other powerful social and legal forces influencing the 
conduct of prosecutors, judges, survivors, defendants, and juries). 
42. See also Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex Offenders: 
Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 277, 277 
(2010) (arguing that the “‘sex offender’ has been juridically codified as the exhaustive figure of sexual 
amorality and dangerousness, a position vacated by the once homophobic but now more dignified 
juridical construction of the homosexual”). 
43. On Girard’s theory, it is in part the collective yet unspoken awareness that the exclusion of 
the scapegoat is an unsustainable and unethical solution to deep social conflict that motivates the 
intense animus directed at the scapegoat. See, e.g., GIRARD, supra note 31, at 22 (“Despite what is said 
around us persecutors are never obsessed by difference but rather by its unutterable contrary, the lack 
of difference.”). 
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certain post-conviction U.S. criminal sex offense regulations.44 In response, a 
few states have scaled back some of the worst excesses of these regulatory 
approaches.45 These reform efforts have begun to reveal how it might be 
possible to confront other regimes of punitive excess, even in the face of strong 
and emotionally-laden popular attachment to a prevailing regime of harsh but 
counterproductive punishment. 
Still, the retreat from over-criminalization and punitive excess in response 
to minor sex-related offenses, such as public urination or certain forms of 
statutory rape, fails to address the persistent problem of more pervasive, though 
under-heeded, forms of sexual harm such as sex abuse in schools, families, the 
military, churches, and prisons. When the excesses of the criminal regulatory 
regime designed for sexually dangerous strangers are laid bare, the task remains 
of refocusing regulatory attention (and reconfiguring structures of domination 
and disempowerment) so as to reduce the risk of more common forms of sexual 
harm between intimates. This Essay thus aims to unmask the misguided 
contours of the status quo regime in a manner that might enable the important 
work of addressing (and reforming) those locations where interpersonal sexual 
harm is most prevalent. These central social locations and the problems within 
them differ from one another in significant respects, and each location is best 
approached in a context-sensitive manner rather than through broadly tailored 
provisions targeting “sex offenders” as a largely undifferentiated class: sexual 
harm in schools is produced and sustained by different institutional dynamics 
than those at issue in the military, which differ from those that arise in the 
context of the family and in prisons. The relevant problems and harms are vast, 
to some degree institution specific, and are likely not entirely eliminable. 
Nonetheless, the unmasking and mapping undertaken here open the exploration 
of a range of underutilized macro-level preventive regulatory ideas—a distinct, 
less common approach to what is referred to in criminal law scholarship as 
“preventive justice.”46 These regulatory possibilities include external 
 
44. See, e.g., Lorraine Bailey, San Diego Sex Offenders Upset Residency Limit, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/09/14/50302.htm (“It is 
‘unreasonable’ and ‘oppressive’ to forbid registered sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a 
school or park, a California appeals court ruled.”). 
45. See, e.g., LEON, supra note 2, at 193 (“State legislators who in the past would not consider 
any revisions to existing sex offender policies that did not extend its punitiveness now acknowledge 
that there are problems. Advocates have noted that legislators are now willing to discuss reforms in 
private, whereas in the early 2000s, such doors to dialogue were closed.”). 
46. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Preventive Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015); see also ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2014) 
(“Preventive measures taken by the state in order to reduce risks to harm are legion. . . . Our concern 
lies with preventive measures that involve some element of coercion or loss of liberty, whether minor 
or substantial.”). Bernard E. Harcourt, Punitive Preventive Justice: A Critique, in PREVENTION AND 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 252 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (exploring how punitive 
preventive measures like “broken windows” policing, stop and frisk, and mass incarceration mask 
political choices about crime control in a cost-benefit rhetoric focused on efficiency and prevention 
that fails to make available the actual political stakes of “preventive justice,” as well as other possibly 
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institutional monitoring and auditing alongside efforts to combat institutional 
secrecy, stigma, and shame; related institutional transparency-forcing 
initiatives; the use of physical infrastructure, design, and community economic 
development projects as means of limiting interpersonal harm; empowerment 
of vulnerable populations; modes of restorative redress; vastly narrowed 
deployment of prosecutorial and punishment resources; and an expansion and 
opening of sexual discourse.47 
This Essay unfolds in three parts. Part I seeks to illuminate how the 
dominant criminal regulatory regime focuses on sexual offending in ways that 
are draconian, ineffective, and unjust. Rather than examining the negative 
unintended consequences associated with discrete sex offense regulatory 
mechanisms, such as registration, community notification, or civil 
commitment,48 Part I exposes how the interplay of the various regulations 
targeting sex offending renders this regulatory regime antagonistic to its 
intended preventive and other goals and contributes to additional violence and 
suffering for both accused persons and survivors of sexual harm. 
 Part I also explores why, despite the fact that it does more harm than 
good, this regulatory approach continues to capture widespread popular and 
political support—namely, because it alleviates social anxiety about the depth 
and difficulty of addressing pathologies in our schools, families, and churches, 
and instead locates the problems of sexual violence and abuse in a fantasy 
about how sexual harm might be eliminated primarily by identifying dangerous 
individuals to be publicly shamed and physically excluded from communities 
otherwise presumed to be harmonious. This analysis of the discourse of sex 
offense regulation draws on an array of sources: previously unexplored 
 
competing policy objectives such as poverty alleviation or educational equality); CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2011) 
(presenting a detailed new model for the juvenile justice system that would focus on rehabilitation and 
reintegration into society). 
47. In this regard, this Essay is part of a broader effort to understand the limits of and 
motivated attachment to excessively harsh, individualized, and overbroad criminal regulatory 
frameworks, which are all too often invoked as a means of managing complex social concerns. 
Simultaneously, in line with earlier and ongoing work, I hope to make more plausible social 
institutional reform alternatives that might better address the relevant human needs at stake in 
particular contexts. See generally Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils 
of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-
Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Allegra M. 
McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83 (2010). 
48. See, e.g., JANUS, supra note 19, at 9 (focusing primarily on preventive detention, civil 
commitment, or what the author calls “predator laws”); NORMAN-EADY, supra note 6 (focusing on 
residency restrictions); Prescott, supra note 25 (focusing on registration); Prescott & Rockoff, supra 
note 21 (focusing on registration and notification); Simon, supra note 33 (focusing on civil 
commitment and notification measures as indicative of the emergence of a category of “monstrous sex 
offenders”); see also LEON, supra note 2 (examining critically the historical emergence of and shifts in 
sex offender regulation from 1930 to 2011 and identifying distinct regulatory frameworks including a 
focus on “sexual psychopaths” from 1930 to 1955, rehabilitation from 1950 to 1980, and containment 
from 1980 to 2011). 
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ethnographic and human rights reports on sexual offense regulation; court 
opinions; quantitative and qualitative empirical analyses of sex offender 
restrictions; critical theoretical and sociological scholarship on sexual harm; 
and a novel by Russell Banks, Lost Memory of Skin, which illuminates some of 
the more subtle yet profound social problems manifest in this criminal 
regulatory landscape. In combination, these sources provide overwhelming 
evidence of the misguided configuration of the prevailing post-conviction U.S. 
criminal regulatory framework governing sexual harm. 
Part II examines advocates’ efforts in particular jurisdictions to constrain 
the overreach and misdirection of sex offense regulation, offering a potentially 
broader model for ratcheting down regimes of over-criminalization and 
misidentification of harm by calling attention to the threats produced by 
criminal regulation itself. 
Part III preliminarily explores what a more varied, preventive social 
institutional regulatory approach to sex offending would entail, both as a 
framework for regulating sexual harm alongside a significantly narrowed 
conventional prosecutorial and punitive focus, and (in only the broadest initial 
strokes) as a more general criminal law reform program. This framework 
contemplates how it might be possible to regulate sexual abuse and other forms 
of interpersonal harm in large measure outside the criminal law administrative 
domain. 
I. 
MISREGULATING SEXUAL HARM 
The increasingly uniform post-conviction criminal regulatory framework 
for addressing sexual harm in the United States is, as this part will elucidate, 
dysfunctional, overbroad, and excessively punitive, and undermines just, 
effective, and compassionate response to sexual violence and abuse. This 
regime operates by (A) registering a large class of convicted sex offenders, 
(B) notifying the public of the identities of registered individuals, (C) imposing 
restrictions concerning where registered individuals may live, (D) monitoring 
registered individuals with harsh carceral consequences for failure to comply 
with applicable restrictions, and (E) for a limited number of persons believed to 
be especially prone to committing further sex offenses, indefinite civil 
confinement following completion of their criminal sentences.49 This Part 
examines the various components of this regime and their interactions, 
revealing the myriad respects in which this criminal regulatory framework 
 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 149–50 (2010) (holding that it is within 
Congress’s authority to permit civil commitment of convicted sex offenders already in federal 
custody); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001) (upholding Washington State’s procedures for 
civil commitment of certain convicted sex offenders); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) 
(upholding Kansas’s procedures for civil commitment of certain convicted sex offenders under 
Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act). 
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perpetuates more damage than good. This Part tracks how this regime produces 
a feared category of persons, draconian responses to these persons, and 
misdirected fears. This regime naturalizes the composition of this feared 
category and these peculiar modes of response to this population, responses 
which include substantial carceral punishment for noncompliance with post-
conviction sanctions such as reregistration.50 Once the disconnect between this 
regime and the underlying problems surrounding sexual harm is clearly 
exposed, it will be more apparent precisely why different conceptual and 
institutional approaches are called for in the regulation of sexual harm. 
Before turning to the specific components of the prevailing regime, it 
bears exploring further first an overarching problem that cuts across each of the 
various components: that is, the mismatch between the reality of commonly 
experienced sexual harm in the United States51 and the focus of the dominant 
statutory framework on quite unusual offenses by presumably dangerous 
strangers.52 These are horrific crimes, about which everyone is appropriately 
concerned, but they occur very infrequently and the measures that are imagined 
to reduce the risk of their occurrence are quite different than the measures that 
would meaningfully respond to other more common risks of sexual violence 
and abuse. Whereas the predominant criminal regulatory regime focuses on 
stranger rapes and murders, particularly of children, these awful offenses 
constitute a very small percentage of sexual assaults.53 
This mismatch developed, as noted briefly above, as the reigning statutory 
framework came into effect in response to a small number of these egregious, 
violent crimes against young children, perpetrated by persons unknown to the 
victims’ families.54 The statutes enacted in the wake of these rapes and murders 
of children are almost all named after the young victims. Megan’s Laws are 
named in memory of Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl who was sexually 
assaulted and murdered by a convicted sex offender living in her 
neighborhood.55 Megan’s Laws require adult sex offenders (and in many states, 
juvenile sex offenders) to register with the police and often to notify the 
community of their presence.56 The Adam Walsh Act is named after a six-year-
old boy who was kidnapped by a stranger from a Sears department store and 
 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodaux, 133 S.Ct. 2496 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
51. See, e.g., TEWKSBURY & LEVENSON, supra note 1. 
52. See, e.g., SNYDER, supra note 1. 
53. See, e.g., TEWKSBURY & LEVENSON, supra note 1; SNYDER, supra note 1. 
54. See Kelly M. Socia, Jr. & Janet P. Stamatel, Assumptions and Evidence Behind Sex 
Offender Laws: Registration, Community Notification, and Residential Restrictions, 4 SOC. COMPASS 
1, 1 (2010). 
55. See ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 118; William Glaberson, Stranger on the Block—A 
Special Report; At Center of ‘Megan’s Law’ Case, a Man No One Could Reach, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/28/nyregion/stranger-block-special-report-center-megan-s 
-law-case-man-no-one-could-reach.html. 
56. See ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 118. 
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decapitated.57 The Adam Walsh Act makes it a felony to fail to register, 
establishes a classification scheme for the registration of sex offenders, and 
requires some offenders to re-register as often as every three months for life.58 
The Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website, administered by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), is named after a twenty-two-year-old female 
college student, who was kidnapped and murdered by a convicted sex offender 
after he crossed state lines to commit the crime.59 These and other measures try 
to address a broad array of sex-related convictions, but are tailored to respond 
to the figure of the vicious offending stranger who perpetrated the murder of 
the young person after whom the statute or database is named.60 Similar 
statutes have proliferated nationally, with minimal local variation, in large 
measure because federal statutes condition federal criminal justice funding to 
states on state adoption of the relevant components of this regime.61 
Criminologist Mona Lynch has powerfully captured how the figure of the 
dangerous stranger dominated the federal legislative debates leading to the 
enactment of the sex offense regulatory regime at the federal level. The 
relevant “predator was never described as a family member, neighbor, or friend 
of potential victims.”62 Instead, as Lynch elucidates: “The prototypical 
offender/perpetrator was always characterized as a stranger and an outsider, 
even though only about 3 percent of sexual abuse against children is committed 
by strangers and 6 percent of child murders are committed by strangers.”63 
In a statement typical of the legislative understanding of the target of the 
 
57. See id. at 118–19; see also Rich Phillips, Police: Drifter Killed Adam Walsh in 1981, CNN 
(Dec. 16, 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/12/16/walsh.case.closed/index.html. 
58. See id. 
59. See DRU SJODIN NATIONAL SEX OFFENDER PUBLIC WEBSITE, http://www.nsopw.gov/en 
-US/Home/DruSjodin (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). 
60. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 10, 18, 21, 28 & 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012) (stating 
that the Adam Walsh Act was enacted “[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and 
offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against the 
victims listed below,” and proceeding to list Jacob Wetterling, Dru Sjodin, and Polly Klaas among 
fourteen other child victims); see also Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators as 
Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, Pollution and Boundary Invasions in Federal 
Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 545 (2002). 
61. The Adam Walsh Act, for example, nationalizes certain registration and notification 
requirements. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 
Stat. 587 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 10, 18, 21, 28 & 42 U.S.C.). The 1994 Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Act, named after a boy who was kidnapped at 
age eleven and whose fate remains unknown, and a subsequent 1996 amendment, condition federal 
grants to police departments on compliance with classification and notifications requirements. See 
ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 118–19; see also Robin Morse, Federalism Challenges to the 
Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753, 1759 (2009); Emily A. White, Prosecutions Under the Adam 
Walsh Act: Is America Keeping Its Promise?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1783, 1787 (2008) (discussing 
the conditioning of federal funds on state compliance with relevant sex offense registry and related 
measures). 
62. See Lynch, supra note 60, at 545. 
63. See id. 
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federal sex offender statutes, Representative Bill McCollum (R-Florida) 
cautioned: “It is well recognized that sexual predators are remarkably clever 
and persistently transient. The offenders are not confined within state lines, and 
neither should our efforts to keep track of them.”64 
Congress justified its uniform national approach to the problem of sexual 
harm with reference to the wily itinerant nature of the stranger sex offender and 
his or her persistent use of the internet to lure children to sexual danger. Former 
Senator Joseph Biden, then representing Delaware in the Senate, explained: 
If any states fail to act [to establish registration 
systems] . . . there . . . [will] be a black hole where sexual predators 
can hide . . . . We now seek to build a system where all movements of 
sexually violent and child offenders can be tracked and we will go a 
long way toward the day when none of these predators will fall 
between the cracks.65 
Congressman Charles Schumer (D-New York) similarly indicated: 
I think that what people have to understand is . . . that sexual offenders 
are different . . . . Long prison terms do not deter them. All too often, 
special rehabilitation programs do not cure them. No matter what we 
do, the minute they get back on the street, many of them resume their 
hunt for victims, beginning a restless and unrelenting prowl for 
children, innocent children to molest, abuse and in the worst cases, to 
kill. So we need to do all we can to stop these predators.66 
The targeted offender was thus understood to be at high risk of interstate flight, 
unknown to his or her victims, and unusually prone to recidivate. 
Although there was no meaningful confirmatory evidence, legislators 
believed that the Internet and pornography served as tools used by child sexual 
predators to locate victims. According to Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee 
(D-Texas), who spoke in floor debates in 1997 and again in 1998: 
So many of us can recount the tragedies of children in our community 
being dragged away from the safety and sanctity of their home and 
school . . . as a vicious sexual attack is perpetrated upon them. We 
certainly stand in support of moving forward to assist in creating an 
atmosphere where not one tree leaf or not one cover can keep us away 
from spotting a malicious child molester or sexual predator.67 
Representative Jackson-Lee focused on Internet technology as especially 
productive of the sexual threat to children perpetrated by strangers: 
The sickness of child predators is prevalent. It is growing. So 
many . . . jurisdictions have tried to track these sexual predators and 
work, if you will, to fight against this siege upon our 
 
64. 142 CONG. REC. H11,132 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum). 
65. 142 CONG. REC. S3423 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Joe Biden). 
66. 142 CONG. REC. H4453 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Charles Schumer). 
67. 143 CONG. REC. H7631 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee). 
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community . . . . We must act to protect our young people from the 
scourge of child predators seeking to harm them through Internet 
communication, and we must act now. 68 
Relatedly, she explained: “I introduced an additional amendment to this 
legislation that would further protect our children from the types of predator 
who may be currently lurking behind our family computer screens.”69 
Representative Jim Bachus (R-Alabama) remarked further on the use of child 
pornography by strangers on the Internet to seduce children into situations of 
stranger sexual abuse: 
[Most people] are surprised when they learn that child pornography is 
the tool of choice used by child molesters and pedophiles to entice 
young children into sexual activities. . . . Bottom line, let us remember 
that child pornography is used in every community in America to lure 
children into this child abuse.70 
Representative Jennifer Dunn (R-Washington) proposed that the 1998 statute 
was “for families throughout the country who are doing everything they can to 
keep their children safe and innocent, but may not be aware of the pedophiles 
who are cruising the internet.”71 
These ideas about stranger internet sexual predation circulating in 
congressional statements have informed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and other law enforcement investigative practices in the intervening years, 
though this focus on stranger internet sexual predation fails to reflect the 
available evidence about sexual violence and abuse and may in fact produce 
more problems than it resolves. Although crimes in which a young child is 
kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and killed by a stranger (through the internet or 
abduction in public) are so terrible and terrifying that they are seared into the 
public consciousness, they are a very small proportion of the many tens of 
thousands of child sex abuses and sexual assaults that occur each year. Reliable 
statistics on sexual abuse of children are difficult to obtain with estimates of 
victimization of girls ranging from 6 to 62 percent and for boys from 3 to 24 
percent.72 Some 89,500 instances of sexual abuse of children were 
substantiated in the year 2000 by child protective services organizations.73 By 
 
68. 144 CONG. REC. H4493 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at H4497 (statement of Rep. Jim Bachus). 
71. Id. at H4492 (statement of Rep. Jennifer Dunn). 
72.  See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 
(2001).  
73. See DAVID FINKELHOR & LISA M. JONES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, EXPLANATIONS FOR THE 
DECLINE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 1 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
ojjdp/199298.pdf (reporting there were 89,500 cases of sexual abuse substantiated by child protective 
service agencies in 2000 and an estimated 150,000 cases of sexual abuse of children substantiated in 
1992); MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST CHILDREN: THEORY, 
ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION viii (2008) (noting that “[t]he average rate of childhood sexual 
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contrast, DOJ estimates that approximately one hundred and fifteen children 
are abducted annually by nonfamily strangers, and less than half are later 
killed.74 And, of the roughly forty-five children annually who are killed after 
being abducted by strangers,75 it is unknown how many are subjected to sexual 
abuse.76 Many tens of thousands of kidnappings of children are perpetrated 
each year by family members and family acquaintances.77 Child kidnappings 
by strangers are almost always reported, but figures of reported and 
substantiated sexual assault and abuse likely underestimate the occurrence of 
these offenses because of underreporting attributable to survivors’ fear, loyalty 
to the abuser, and shame.78 Twenty percent of female college students report 
having been sexually assaulted, and many thousands of men and women are 
sexually assaulted in the military and in prisons each year.79 But studies 
suggest that as few as 20 percent or less of people who are sexually assaulted 
report the offense and still fewer pursue criminal charges.80 
Yet, as a primary manner of addressing the perpetration of sexual harm, 
FBI agents posing as children or purveyors of child pornography now routinely 
contact people in chatrooms or through floating ads seeking to entice strangers 
to reveal an intent to have sex with children or to purchase child pornography.81 
There is substantial indication that at least certain persons identified online by 
the FBI in this manner would not have chosen to pursue sex with children or 
child pornography without the encouragement of law enforcement agents; the 
defendants in at least some instances arguably perceived the agents as role-
playing adults. Federal sentences in these cases are long, routinely ten years 
 
abuse recalled by adult respondents” in a multi-national study of 19 countries “was approximately 
20% for women and 10% for men”). 
74. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 
NATIONAL REPORT 44 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/ 
NR2006.pdf; see also DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NONFAMILY ABDUCTED CHILDREN: NATIONAL 
ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/ 
196467.pdf (reporting that in 60 percent of nonfamily stranger kidnappings the child survived and in 
56 percent the child was recovered and returned to his or her parents within the study year). 
75. See FINKELHOR ET AL., supra note 73, at 2. 
76. See id. (noting that during the study year slightly less than half of the 115 child victims of 
stranger kidnappings were sexually assaulted by the perpetrator). 
77. See HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY FAMILY MEMBERS: NATIONAL 
ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/MC17.pdf 
(reporting 203,900 children were victims of a family member abduction in 1999); see also FINKELHOR 
ET AL., supra note 73, at 2 (noting over 58,000 child victims in the study year who were abducted by 
family friends and known family acquaintances); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 74, at 44. 
78. See, e.g., ALLAN, supra note 28, at 14–15. 
79. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 10; Glazek, supra note 14. 
80. See, e.g., ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 145. 
81. See Adler, supra note 72, at 219 (arguing that “the burgeoning of child pornography may 
invite its own violation” and that the law may “perpetuate and escalate the sexual representation of 
children that it seeks to constrain”). 
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and up to thirty years.82 And the allocation of resources to this work has little, 
if any, demonstrated effect on widespread problems of sexual assault and 
abuse. 
In United States v. Poehlman, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction and vacated a sentence exceeding ten 
years imposed on a man who the court found was entrapped by a government 
agent when he went online looking for adult romantic partners. Judge Alex 
Kozinski, writing for the majority, explained: 
Mark Poehlman, a cross-dresser and foot-fetishist, sought the company 
of like-minded adults on the Internet. After graduating from high 
school, Mark Poehlman joined the Air Force, where he remained for 
nearly 17 years. Eventually, he got married and had two children. 
When Poehlman admitted to his wife that he couldn’t control his 
compulsion to cross-dress, she divorced him. So did the Air Force, 
which forced him into early retirement, albeit with an honorable 
discharge. These events left Poehlman lonely and depressed. He began 
trawling Internet “alternative lifestyle” discussion groups in an effort 
to find a suitable companion. Unfortunately, the women who 
frequented these groups were less accepting than he had hoped. After 
they learned of Poehlman’s proclivities, several retorted with strong 
rebukes. One even recommended that Poehlman kill 
himself. . . . Eventually, Poehlman got a positive reaction from a 
woman named Sharon. Poehlman started his correspondence with 
Sharon when he responded to an ad in which she indicated that she 
was looking for someone who understood her family’s “unique needs” 
and preferred servicemen.83 
Ultimately, “Sharon,” a government agent, lured Poehlman through online 
exchanges into agreeing to be a “special teacher” to her daughters and to train 
them about sexual matters, including by having sex with them.84 There was no 
suggestion that Poehlman had any such interest himself until Sharon, well into 
their correspondence, conditioned her affection on his willingness to discuss 
these matters and persistently requested exploration of this topic. Poehlman 
appeared to try to avoid the topic, though he expressed his love for Sharon.85 In 
the end, Poehlman wrote Sharon emails expressing his willingness to play her 
game of sexually training her daughters; he was arrested when he travelled to 
meet Sharon in a hotel.  
Other than the suggestions of members of Congress and the investment of 
 
82. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)–(e) (2012) (providing criminal sentences for various crimes 
involving transportation of minors, including: imprisonment for ten years to life for transporting a 
minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, imprisonment for up to thirty years for 
travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and imprisonment for up to thirty years for 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places). 
83. United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2000). 
84. Id. 
85. See id. at 696–99. 
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public resources in this approach to regulating sexual harm through internet 
stings, there is no proof that there is a meaningful correspondence between the 
class of persons likely to sexually harm children or adults and the class of 
persons who the FBI contacts on the internet. As a consequence, as Judge 
Kozinski wrote for the majority in Poehlman, it may be wasteful and 
“unnecessary for our law enforcement officials to spend months luring an 
obviously lonely and confused individual to cross the line between fantasy and 
criminality.”86 
This dominant regulatory approach is thus especially wrong-headed 
insofar as it diverts attention and resources from addressing sexual abuse 
perpetrated with great frequency and without any elaborate engagement of the 
Internet. The problem is not just the rarity of stranger internet-originated sexual 
abuse or the diversion of resources to law enforcement operations concentrated 
on that problem, however, but that abuse and violence that occur between 
intimates are hardly considered at all. 
In addition to this overarching mismatch between the dominant regulatory 
regime focused on especially dangerous strangers prone to internet sexual 
predation, and the complicated reality of sexual harm between intimates, this 
purportedly preventive framework entails another series of pathologies 
occasioned by its orientation toward scapegoating and banishment. The 
following sections will address each of the five key components of this 
purportedly preventive post-conviction regulatory framework—registry, 
community notification, residential restrictions, monitoring and sanctions, and 
civil commitment—their problems, and their interactions in turn. 
A. Registry 
A person convicted of a sex offense, upon release from custody or upon 
receipt of a sentence of supervised release, must register as mandated by 
federal, state, and local law.87 One is required to record his or her name, 
address, and whereabouts; pursuant to some registry laws, one must submit a 
photograph, employment information, and other personal identifying details.88 
Reregistration may be required as often as every ninety days and an individual 
may be required to register for life.89 Sixty percent of persons convicted of sex 
offenses are on probation or parole at any given time, and virtually all are 
subject to registration requirements.90 
 
86. Id. at 705. 
87. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 311 (West 2014); Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA), DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/ 
sorna.html (last visited August 31, 2014); see also LEON, supra note 2, at 117. 
88. See, e.g., Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), supra note 88.  
89. See, e.g., LEON, supra note 2, at 117 (“By the end of the [twentieth] century, people with 
convictions for noncontact offenses such as indecent exposure and possession of child pornography 
were required to register for life as sex offenders.”). 
90. See ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 128. 
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Registration laws were enacted across the country in the wake of passage 
of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act of 1994, which established a national database of sex 
offenders and made states’ receipt of federal anti-crime funds conditional on 
creating sex offender registries.91 Registries respond to a perception of sex 
offenders as itinerant strangers, intent on perpetrating violent sexual harm on 
children outside their immediate circle of acquaintances. Legislators hoped that 
registration laws would enable law enforcement to gather information about 
offenders’ whereabouts, to closely monitor dangerous individuals, and to 
readily identify suspects when a crime was reported.92 
The registry effectively produces this peculiarly configured category, 
lumping a disparate assortment of individuals together.93 Persons classified as 
sex offenders constitute a diverse group; apart from their legal status, these men 
and women have little else in common. 
Since 1994, the class of persons subject to registration has grown 
exponentially. Thirteen states require registration for persons caught urinating 
in public (two of which require registration only if a child was present); at least 
five states extend registration requirements to persons who are caught visiting 
sex workers; thirty-two states apply registration requirements to persons whose 
convicted conduct amounts to flashing or streaking; and no fewer than twenty-
nine states require registration for adolescents who have sex with other 
adolescents even where the sex is consensual but for the statutorily created 
impossibility of the younger party’s consent.94 Registered offenders convicted 
of child pornography-related offenses include teenagers who consensually take 
pictures of themselves and share them with other teenagers by text message—a 
common practice among approximately 20 percent of American youth referred 
to as “sexting.”95 In seventeen states, registration is for life.96 
Registration laws’ broad reach, which produces this large and 
heterogeneous class of registered sex offenders, might be understood in 
reference to several law enforcement objectives and social forces—even though 
containment of sexual harm through monitoring databases is a daunting and 
likely ineffective undertaking. First, the sentences that sex offenders ultimately 
receive do not necessarily reflect the seriousness of their crimes, given the 
 
91. See, e.g., RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 22, at 15. 
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012). 
93. See, e.g., Ackerman et al., supra note 24, at 150–57. 
94. See Sex Laws: Unjust and Ineffective, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14164614; see also CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 230 (analyzing 
Kansas’s sex offender registry, which extends to convictions for “soliciting or promoting 
prostitution . . . and intent to manufacture drugs (primarily methamphetamines)”); JANUS, supra note 
19, at 69 (explaining that Michigan’s public sex offender registry has included teenagers convicted of 
having consensual sex with other teenagers). 
95. See, e.g., Marsha Levick & Kristina Moon, Prosecuting Sexting As Child Pornography: A 
Critique, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1035, 1040 n.4 (2010). 
96. See Sex Laws, supra note 94. 
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prevalence of plea and charge bargaining which may distort the actual conduct 
that may underlie any given conviction.97 Imposing some registration 
requirements on all persons convicted of sex offenses, even relatively minor 
ones, may be an effort to ensure that more serious perpetrators do not slip 
through the cracks. Second, some believe that minor offenses may serve as a 
proxy for identifying potentially serious offenders. Although largely 
unsubstantiated, this belief has developed out of a desire to address the sexual 
harm perpetrated by a relatively small class of vicious, dangerous, sexually 
predatory persons who may not be identifiable otherwise until they have 
perpetrated grave harm. Additionally, the sense that sexual offending is 
prevalent despite under-reporting produces a pressure to “catch” and contain 
“sex offenders” wherever they may be found and with ever increasing 
purportedly deterrent severity—a sentiment reflected in the legislative history 
discussed earlier.98 A further factor that may explain the tolerance for the 
massive expansion of registration requirements is the disproportionately 
socioeconomically subordinate and racial minority status of persons subject to 
criminal prosecution in general.99 
Regardless of any available explanations for the emergence and growth of 
the registries, the overbreadth of the registration requirements has produced 
numerous problems. The large number of persons required to register 
undermines the rolls’ ability to identify genuinely dangerous individuals.100 
Maintaining such large rolls of sex offenders inhibits effective law 
enforcement.101 It becomes difficult for law enforcement to distinguish serious 
from non-serious offenders and to appropriately prioritize resources.102 
 
 97. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 512 
(2004); John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury 
Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 120 (1992) (“[O]ur guarantee of routine criminal jury trial is a 
fraud.”). 
 98. See also Amy Adler, To Catch a Predator, 21.2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 130, 134, 157–
58 (2012) (arguing that our identification with the predator in the popular network television series To 
Catch a Predator as well as our concomitant desire, disgust, and shame cause us to disavow that 
identification through the force of an increasingly punitive and incoherent legal structure). 
 99. Early in this nation’s history, the stereotype of the dangerous African American male 
rapist preying on white women was often invoked, and much of the racialized violence of U.S. 
criminal law administration took place in response to such allegations. See Stephen Robertson, 
Separating the Men From the Boys: Masculinity, Psychosexual Development, and Sex Crime in the 
United States, 1930s–1960s, 56 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 3, 5 (2001). It is unclear, though, 
whether the same patterns of racial disproportionality that occur in other contexts of criminal law 
administration are as pronounced in the context of sex offenses; in fact, there is some evidence that 
there is less racial disproportionality in mid- to late-twentieth and twenty-first century sex-related 
prosecutions than is the case for other crimes. See LEON, supra note 2, at 100–02, 106 (There is “less 
disparity in sex offense enforcement by race than the literature might have led us to expect.”).  
100. See, e.g., ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 126 (“[A]dding all sexual offenders to a 
registration list and notifying the public of all sexual offenders makes it next to impossible for law 
enforcement officials to keep track of everyone.”). 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
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California, for example, registers more than 75,000 individuals on its online 
“Megan’s Law” database.103 Approximately 1 in every 375 adults in California, 
of the state’s 28 million residents, is now a registered sex offender.104 
In some instances, law enforcement has simply lost track of thousands of 
persons convicted of sex offenses due to the overwhelming enormity of its 
registries: in 2003, California “lost track of at least 33,000 sex offenders,” 
prompting the attorney general to acknowledge “our system is inadequate, 
woefully inadequate.”105 In a survey conducted in 50 states in 2003, a child 
advocacy group found that “states on average were unable to account for 24 
percent of sex offenders supposed to be in the databases.”106 
A separate but related concern is that the majority of registered offenders 
pose little public threat, so considerable public resources are expended on 
maintaining the registries without good reason.107 In general, persons on the 
registry are not particularly likely to commit additional sex crimes.108 A study 
of nearly 10,000 male sex offenders in fifteen states found that only 5 percent 
were re-arrested for a sex crime within 3 years.109 When the Georgia 
Registration Review Board assessed a sample of the 17,000 offenders on its 
registry in 2008, the Board found that 65 percent of registered offenders posed 
“little threat,” 30 percent posed some potential threat, and only 5 percent were 
“clearly dangerous.”110 Contrary to popular and legislative perceptions, most 
convicted sex offenders are not especially likely to re-offend, or at least to be 
reconvicted.111 In fact, numerous studies have shown that convicted sex 
offenders have lower recidivism rates than other categories of convicted 
offenders.112 
What is more, the most worrisome offenders may not be identifiable based 
on past convictions.113 Many sex offenders are not identified because their 
 
103. See LEON, supra note 2, at 119. 
104. See id. 
105. JANUS, supra note 19, at 67 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
106. See id. 
107. See Sex Laws, supra note 94.  
108. See Leslie Helmus et al., Absolute Recidivism Rates Predicted by Static-99R and Static-
2002R Sex Offender Risk Assessment Tools Vary Across Samples: A Meta-Analysis, 39 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 1148, 1148–49 (2012) (“The sexual recidivism rates for typical sex offenders are lower than 
the public generally believes. . . . Previous research has found that the overall sexual recidivism base 
rate is lower than commonly expected—often in the 10% to 15% range. . . . [L]arge studies in the 
United States have found rates as low as 3% . . . and as high as 35%.”). 
109. See Sex Laws, supra note 94. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See LEON, supra note 2, at 142, 155; see also Marcus T. Boccacini et al., Field Validity of 
the Static-99 and MnSOST-R Among Sex Offenders Evaluated for Civil Commitment as Sexually 
Violent Predators, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 278, 278–314 (2009); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. 
Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism 
Studies, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1154, 1154–63 (2005). 
113. See LEON, supra note 2, at 142, 155; see also Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, 
Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 41 
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victims—children, students, prisoners, members of the military—are afraid to 
report the relevant misconduct, and the authorities responsible for monitoring 
the abusers are not externally incentivized to investigate and respond to the 
abuse in question. Hyper-policing of persons with past sex offense 
convictions—particularly convictions for statutory rape, public exposure, or 
soliciting a sex worker—will do little to nothing to address these broader 
problems of underreporting and underenforcement. The special focus on a 
broad class of persons with prior sex-related convictions is in fact 
counterproductive to the goal of responding proactively to risks of future sexual 
harm, at least without some other indications of a particular convicted 
offender’s likelihood to seriously offend. 
Further, to the extent that convicted offenders fail to register or re-register, 
law enforcement resources are diverted to tracing and punishing technical 
violations. This is a particularly poor use of resources if the registrant is not 
otherwise a threat. 
Insofar as registration requirements are actually retributive, as opposed to 
preventive in their motivation, retributive norms of publicity and 
proportionality are undermined by configuring registration as a backdoor 
punishment justified on a preventive rationale. And in some instances, penalties 
for failure to re-register are grossly disproportionate to the offense in question, 
a problem distinct from the already noted concerns about overbreadth of the 
registries. For example, in 2012, the California Supreme Court upheld a three-
strikes, 25-years-to-life sentence for a sex offender’s failure to re-register.114 
The harsh impact of registration is frequently unjust and disproportionate 
even absent severe collateral sanctions for failure to re-register; these measures 
are particularly excessive when the person is convicted as a child.115 Many 
states require lengthy periods of registration with periodical reregistration, even 
for offenses committed by juveniles. This imposes decades of onerous 
requirements on young and middle-age adults who committed their offenses as 
very young persons.116 
For example, at age fifteen, Jim T. was convicted in Arizona for molesting 
 
(2011) (“The violence risk assessment field may be reaching a point of diminishing returns in 
instrument development. . . . We hope that forensic psychology shifts more of its attention from 
predicting violence to understanding its causes and preventing its (re)occurrence.”). 
114. See In re Coley, 283 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Cal. 2012) (“Petitioner[] . . . was . . . intentionally 
unwilling to comply with an important legal obligation, and thus his triggering criminal conduct bore 
both a rational and substantial relationship to the antirecidivist purposes of the Three Strikes 
law. . . . [W]e conclude that . . . the imposition of a 25-year-to-life sentence does not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment under the circumstances of this case.”). 
115. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING (2009). 
116. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 8–9 
(2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf [hereinafter 
SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US]. 
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his sister beginning when she was six and he was ten years old.117 As a result, 
he was sentenced to three years in an adult lock-down facility where he was 
assaulted several times.118 Jim T. must re-register every ninety days and is 
subject to community notification, addressed in the following section,119 for the 
remainder of his life.120 
In some jurisdictions, intensive reregistration requirements apply to youth 
who were convicted of relatively minor offenses, such as statutory rape for 
having otherwise consensual sex with a high school peer. For example, Dan M. 
was convicted for having sex with a fifteen-year-old when he was seventeen. 
Once in college, he was required to re-register every ninety days between the 
hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, before the fifteenth 
of the month.121 Dan M. explains how the registration requirements shape his 
life: 
When my family and I go on vacation to visit relatives in other states I 
must always look up the law as to my duties regarding the list in a 
particular state. More than two weeks in New York I must register. 
More than three consecutive days in one county in Florida I must 
register. My parents moved to Arkansas. If you are in Arkansas you 
must register after 14 days. They take a statement and fingerprint you. 
It is always like starting it up all over again. I will be visiting my 
parents for more than 30 days in a year so I had to be assessed as to my 
level of risk to re-offend. I had to take a psychological test. I wanted to 
puke [the questions] were so disgusting. Is that the type of person 
people think I am? I am not attracted to children, or dead people. I 
would never rape anyone. . . . I am a good person who made a bad 
decision with a peer 16 months my junior seven weeks after my 17th 
birthday. My coach might send me to New York next summer to play 
baseball. I will have to be assessed by them too. I will have to do this 
for another 23 years. That is how long I have to register.122 
These reregistration requirements will apply to Dan M. well into middle age, 
and he will continue to be subject to invasive reassessments of his sexual 
proclivities whenever he travels for personal or professional purposes. 
The very severity and intrusiveness of these registration requirements may 
make it more difficult for survivors of sexual violence and abuse to seek 
recourse through the criminal process.123 Even absent registration, the 
conventional criminal process is frequently re-traumatizing for rape and sexual 
 
117. See id. at 71. 
118. See id. at 71. 
119. See infra Section I.B. 
120. See SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US, supra note 116, at 71. 
121. See id. at 74. 
122. SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US, supra note 116 at 74–75. 
123. See CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 233 (examining how registration requirements 
“contribute to the erasure of sexual assault in local communities and across the country” by “further 
discouraging identification, prosecution, and conviction of sex crimes”). 
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assault survivors, thus discouraging reporting.124 These problems are 
exacerbated by registration, as judges, juries, prosecutors, and even survivors 
themselves may find the registration measures too harsh, further interfering 
with charging and conviction determinations as well as other operations of the 
criminal process.125 
In a study of the sharp reduction in convictions for registerable offenses in 
South Carolina after the State enacted registration requirements, the authors 
found that “the percentage of cases with initial sex offense charges but non-sex 
offense charges at adjudication doubled.”126 This suggests sex assault cases 
were re-charged to avoid registration and other consequences. Further, “cases 
involving registry-eligible charges were significantly less likely to result in 
guilty dispositions than cases involving nonregistry offenses.”127 The authors 
posit that “online registration decreased the likelihood of convicting guilty 
defendants of sex crimes, possibly because judges, juries, defendants, and 
attorneys considered lifetime online registration too harsh a consequence for 
some defendants.”128 The study’s authors conclude, “[O]nline registration 
could contribute to reduced community safety, by precluding punishment, 
treatment, and supervision for some guilty individuals who avoid sanctions 
altogether.”129  
There is also evidence that persons charged with offenses subject to 
registry are less willing to accept a plea due to the severity of registration 
requirements. This leads more of these cases to either be dropped or go to trial, 
an outcome that often requires survivors to testify in a process that is typically 
re-traumatizing.130 
Even without these complicating factors, however, registration with local 
law enforcement could only be meaningful as a crime control project if it was 
radically scaled back and transformed. For registration to serve its purported 
crime control purpose, the number of registrants would need to be limited to a 
relatively small, manageable group who have perpetrated serious crimes and 
whose risk to re-offend is considerable. (Though in these cases, registration 
would likely be unnecessary and redundant because these individuals would be 
 
124. See Yxta Maya Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1631, 1659 (2012) (“[R]ape victims in the United States . . . face the prospect of police 
incredulity and inaction.”); see also SUSAN J. BRISON, AFTERMATH: VIOLENCE AND THE REMAKING 
OF A SELF 108 (2002) (discussing the aftermath of Brison’s own rape and the criminal trial, which 
required her to recount her violent assault in public to be assessed against her assailant’s narrative in 
defense, requiring her to remain vigilant and immersed in all of the awful details so that it was only 
after the trial that she could leave the horror behind); Fan, supra note 28, at 776–78. 
125. See CORRIGAN, supra note 4, at 233. 
126. See Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., The Effects of Sex Offender Registration and 
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subject to intensive supervision and court-mandated treatment or incarceration 
in any event.) Further, the efficacy of registration would turn on substantively 
engaging and integrating supervised persons into a range of life activities that 
actually inhibit reoffending rather than simply sanctioning noncompliance in an 
ad hoc manner with arbitrary technical requirements and other degrading, 
criminogenic interventions. But this narrowed, more focused mode of 
registration of persons convicted of very serious offenses who are reasonably 
believed to be at high risk of re-offense could not constitute any major part of a 
regulatory framework for addressing more pervasive, often unreported sexual 
abuse and violence. In any case, any such drastically scaled back and 
rationalized registration regime bears no resemblance to current U.S. criminal 
regulatory practices. 
Instead, as registration laws currently stand, the United States leads the 
world in the extremity of its sex offense registration requirements.131 Due to 
their massive size, U.S. sex offender registration databases cease to serve as 
useful tools for identifying likely dangerous persons. They become instead a 
vehicle for humiliating a large class of citizens, including young people, in 
some instances for the entirety of their lives. And registration requirements 
create a category of feared persons that corresponds poorly with the reality of 
how sexual harm is perpetrated and experienced. These pathologies, organized 
around scapegoating and often-misidentified threats, are exacerbated by the 
community notification provisions with which registration laws are often 
paired. 
B. Community Notification 
Community notification mandates operate in tandem with registration 
requirements in most jurisdictions.132 Notification laws require that states and 
municipalities inform residents, employers, and schools of the presence of 
persons with registered sex offense convictions living in the area.133 Often the 
whereabouts of the individuals in question are posted to the Internet with an 
accompanying photograph.134 In other jurisdictions, interested parties must 
approach law enforcement with a request for information.135 Notification may 
 
131. See generally CORRIGAN, supra note 4; LEON, supra note 2; Sex Laws, supra note 94. 
132. See LEON, supra note 2, at 119. 
133. See id. 
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z6o+ISRI2FF (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) (displaying images of “offenders” and “predators” and 
requesting that the public “[h]elp us locate these people”). 
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take place online, at community meetings, or by other means.136 As of 2006, all 
fifty states had notification laws in place.137 
Community notification produces serious, deleterious unintended 
consequences beyond the humiliation and resource drain occasioned by 
registration requirements. In the most extreme instances, community 
notification requirements expose persons convicted of sex offenses, even minor 
offenses, to vigilante violence and abuse. In 2013 in South Carolina, for 
example, a double murder was linked to a suspect who admitted he went 
through the sex offender registry looking for persons to kill; he had planned to 
kill more people in the coming days using the same approach, explaining to his 
victims, “I’m here to kill you because you’re a child molester.”138 In enabling 
vigilante violence, community notification requirements operate in line with 
two broader trends: they rely on oversimplified punitive responses to complex 
social problems (“governing through crime”) and they pass considerable 
responsibility for maintaining social order back to communities and private 
security forces—a trend which some argue persuasively is a feature of a more 
general neoliberal penality.139 
Vigilante violence, even if rare, thus places convicted sex offenders 
subject to registration in a frightening bind: either be subject to felony 
reconviction and reincarceration for failure to register, or risk severe physical 
attacks and harassment. While this is obviously cruel as applied to persons 
convicted of minor offenses, the harshness entailed by the community 
notification regime—forcing a choice between social ostracism, or even lethal 
violence, and lengthy reincarceration—is unjust as a collateral sanction even as 
applied to individuals with more serious convictions. 
Community notification may also undermine compliance with registration 
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requirements. In the words of one convicted offender: 
Registration ain’t all bad. . . . But, there are a lot of nuts out there so 
you got to be real careful. That’s why a lot of ex-offenders don’t 
register because they don’t want people to know who they are and 
come kill them or burn down their house or something. . . . And now 
that I got to register I am on the Internet for ten years. My picture is on 
the Internet for ten years. I don’t want nothing bad to happen to me, 
but I am afraid that registering on the Internet will make something 
bad happen, so that’s why a lot of guys don’t even register. They’re 
afraid.140 
Even without violence or persistent harassment, the social isolation 
produced by community notification poses further criminogenic risks. 
Community notification makes it hard for convicted offenders to reintegrate, 
diminishing the efficacy of informal social controls like employment and 
neighborhood oversight that have been repeatedly shown to inhibit criminal 
conduct.141 Although there is some indication that drastically limited and 
down-scaled registration requirements may enable crime control, the available 
evidence suggests that community notification actually increases risks of 
recidivism as the psychological and social strain of community notification 
undermines individuals’ capacities for legal compliance.142 
Perhaps even more than registration, community notification is 
particularly burdensome and concerning when applied to young people whose 
culpability is lessened in virtue of their young age and whose vulnerability is 
greater. Louisiana imposes especially onerous requirements on convicted sex 
offenders, both adults and children, including requiring any youth between the 
ages of fourteen and seventeen who live in a city to mail a notification at their 
own expense to all of their neighbors within a one-mile radius, notifying them 
personally of their address and criminal record.143 Further, the youth must take 
out a classified ad in the local paper and register with the local school 
superintendents.144 At a judge’s order, a young person (like convicted adults) 
may be required to display signs on his home or car labeling him as a sex 
offender.145 
Community notification also produces disproportionate fear of dangerous 
but statistically rare child sexual predators residing around any corner. This 
fear, in turn, distracts attention from the locations where sexual harm most 
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often transpires and encourages a range of strategies such as residential 
restrictions, addressed in the following section, that undermine efforts to reduce 
risks of sexual violence and abuse where such conduct most often occurs. 
C. Residential Restrictions 
Numerous jurisdictions have enacted residential restrictions, severely 
limiting the areas in which convicted sex offenders are permitted to live.146 
Residentially restrictive statutes—often called Jessica’s Laws, after Jessica 
Lunsford, a nine-year-old girl who was kidnapped, sexually battered, and 
murdered by a convicted sex offender—vary in their severity and scope.147 
Some ordinances restrict urban residents from living within 1,000 feet of any 
place children may congregate, and other residentially restrictive ordinances 
establish a range of 2,500 or more feet.148 Again, the purported rationale for the 
residential restrictions is that predatory, impulsive, convicted, pedophilic 
strangers will be inhibited from reoffending if they are not living near schools, 
bus stops, day care centers, or other locations where these individuals could 
more readily abduct and harm children. 
Residential restrictions have come under criticism, both for their 
inhumanity and their inefficacy.149 The restrictions routinely cause those 
subject to them to become homeless because individuals cannot find a place 
where they can live in compliance with the restrictions, particularly in urban 
environments.150 
In Georgia in 2006, when the state began implementing a residency 
restriction that prohibited persons with sex-related convictions from living near 
school bus stops, police officers drove through neighborhoods measuring the 
number of feet between registered individuals’ homes and any place where 
children may congregate, especially bus stops.151 Sheriff’s deputies determined 
that in Atlanta, every single one of the 490 registered sex offenders would be 
evicted, and nearly all of the 478 persons living in the suburban counties—
some 473 individuals—would be forced to move.152 An advocate at the 
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Southern Center for Human Rights, working on this issue in the region at the 
time, described the pandemonium that transpired as a result: 
It is difficult to describe the confusion and panic among people on the 
registry. . . . [O]ur office began to receive calls from registered sex 
offenders. There were calls from sobbing mothers and wives; people 
on the registry who were blind, disabled, and in wheelchairs; and 
people who were undergoing chemotherapy for cancer. There were 
more calls than I can count from people who told us they were 
considering suicide. . . . [S]heriffs’ deputies began delivering eviction 
notices, sometimes in the middle of the night, giving residents just 
days to vacate.153 
Ultimately, Georgia abandoned the most severe of its restrictions, though many 
convicted persons’ lives in Georgia and other states remain severely disrupted 
by other sex offender residential restriction provisions.154 
In California in 2010, registered sex offenders who had been rendered 
homeless in San Diego County challenged the residency restriction in Superior 
Court on the grounds that the restriction violated their “right to intrastate travel, 
their right to establish a home and their right to privacy and because it was not 
narrowly drawn and specifically tailored to the individual circumstances of 
each sex offender parolee.”155 More than 150 registered sex offender parolees 
rendered homeless by the restrictions filed habeas petitions challenging the 
constitutionality of the residency restrictions.156 
The petitions of William Taylor, Jeffery Glynn, Julie Briley, and Stephen 
Todd, all persons with sex offense convictions living in San Diego County, 
were chosen to be the lead cases to establish an evidentiary record for assessing 
the “as applied” constitutionality of the restrictions. All four of these 
individuals were unable to locate stable residences due to the restrictions: 
“Taylor and Briley lived in an alley behind the parole office on the advice of 
their parole agents, Todd lived in the San Diego riverbed with other registered 
sex offenders who had no place to live, and Glynn lived in his van.”157 
Judge Michael Wellington held an eight-day evidentiary hearing in 
Superior Court before finding that the parole condition was impermissible. His 
decision was affirmed on appeal, when the California Court of Appeal for the 
Fourth District concluded: 
[T]he blanket residency restriction exceeds the scope of its stated 
objective—the protection of children—because as applied it eliminates 
nearly all existing affordable housing in San Diego County for sex 
offender parolees, in essence banishing them from living within most 
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if not all of the County . . . , and because it treats all parolees the same 
regardless of whether his or her crime involved victimization of 
children or adults (and thus the need for the residency restriction in the 
first place). Glynn and Taylor are registered sex offenders because 
each of them committed a sex crime against an adult; there is no hint 
of pedophilia in their histories. The exclusion of parolees with 
backgrounds similar to Glynn and Taylor from living near schools and 
parks does not substantially protect children, but as the record here 
shows, it has a tremendous impact on such parolees’ rights and liberty 
without bearing a substantial relation to their crimes.158 
Although the restrictions have been struck down as applied in a blanket 
manner to all parolees, the court permitted similar restrictions to be applied 
with individualized consideration of particular offenders’ cases.159 
Consequently, the problem of homelessness remains for many persons with sex 
offense convictions as a result of the residency restrictions, including in 
California. 
The residency restrictions are not only inhumane, there are significant 
reasons to believe they do not effectively reduce or control crime. Because the 
restrictions generally only apply to residences, it is not clear that they even 
meaningfully inhibit interaction with potential victims, as a registered 
individual could readily access victims at a family member’s home, at work, or 
elsewhere.  
Further, the restrictions may push people into areas with less law 
enforcement oversight where the registered individuals and their families might 
be at risk. The Minnesota Department of Corrections has found that sex 
offenders are more likely to move outside locations where they can be 
meaningfully monitored because of the restrictions.160 California officials 
found that the residency restrictions make it impossible in many places for 
convicted individuals to find a place for their families to live, forcing the state 
to place them “in motels or half-way house settings where multiple sex 
offenders live” at an expense to the state of approximately $25 million 
annually.161 
A proponent of the California residential restrictions, California Senator 
George Runner, acknowledged that homelessness had been an anticipated result 
of the restrictions, but that lawmakers intended GPS monitoring to control 
crime after offenders were displaced from their residences. Runner explained, 
“[W]e knew the consequence from the very beginning; that’s why we included 
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GPS as well as residency requirements.”162 
But GPS monitoring for 6,300 parolees in California in 2009 cost an 
estimated $60 million and likely reduced the time of parole officers to engage 
in more meaningful forms of supervision and public safety-related work.163 For 
this reason as well, the purported public safety benefits of residential 
restrictions are subject to considerable doubt. 
Despite their inhumanity and questionable crime control benefits, the 
residency restrictions have spurred communities to use residential zoning as a 
“self-help” strategy for managing risks of sexual violence. For example, in Los 
Angeles, residents have begun to organize “pocket parks” in order to zone 
registered sex offenders out of neighborhoods.164 The residents have converted 
small lots of undeveloped land near halfway houses and other apartment 
complexes into parks in order to effect the eviction of sex offenders who reside 
there.165 
This collective focus or fantasy about the potential of residential 
restrictions to reduce sexual violence and abuse runs counter to the evidence 
about reducing the incidence of criminal offenses generally, instead enlisting 
communities in harmful, likely criminogenic projects of ostracism. 
Specifically, this approach disregards the substantial body of sociological and 
criminological scholarship that suggests that social engagement and 
institutional involvement, or “group-level effects,” reduce criminal 
offending.166 These studies link structural context and the prevalence of 
effective social organizations with decreased interpersonal violence and 
neighborhood disorder. 
The theory of group-level effects or neighborhood effects also accords 
with known social facts about the world: employers and community 
organizations convey social expectations and informally monitor those who 
participate in them. In a neighborhood where these institutions are functioning 
effectively, people tend to be discouraged and inhibited from engaging in 
criminalized pursuits, and have access to social supports in the event they find 
themselves struggling with addiction or other personal challenges. In other 
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words, reasonable educational opportunities, access to employment, and 
informal institutional social controls are associated with improved public 
safety.167 It is unknown what impact, if any, group-level effects have in the 
context of sexual offending, but to the extent social isolation, stress, and 
substance abuse wear down a person’s defenses against destructive behavior 
generally, one might expect the same to hold in the context of perpetrating 
sexual harm.168 The foundational idea, in any event, ought to apply to the 
regulation of sexual harm, namely that social institutions beyond the criminal 
law context are critical to the maintenance of social order and to organizing 
informal surveillance.169 Correspondingly, a shift away from the effective 
banishment of convicted sex offenders might actually reduce those individuals’ 
likelihood of offending and bolster opportunities for social integration and 
meaning-generating, constructive institutional involvement. 
Russell Banks’s novel Lost Memory of Skin illuminates some of the 
further more subtle dysfunction manifest in the residency restrictions’ neglect 
of the importance of social connection. Lost Memory of Skin reveals the failure 
of social institutions and the role of social dislocation as well as hypocritical 
and arbitrarily puritanical attitudes towards sex in producing the very conduct 
classified as sex offending.170 Banks’s eerie account interweaves actual 
examples of sex offense regulatory measures with an imaginative literary 
rendering of sex offense regulation’s harms and failings—one that captures the 
criminogenic effects of institutional failure more vividly than similar legal, 
scholarly, or policy accounts of the same phenomenon. 
Lost Memory of Skin centers on the social dislocation of one fictional 
young male convicted sex offender, twenty-two year old “Kid,” who is forced 
to sleep under a causeway in Florida in a sex offender encampment. Banks’s 
novel draws this premise from the well-documented situation of sex offenders 
in Miami, Florida forced to live under a bridge due to the applicable 
residentially restrictive ordinance.171 
Kid, like many convicted sex offenders subject to residential restrictions, 
was convicted of committing a sexual crime even though he never laid a hand 
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on a supposed victim. In fact, the novel’s title references the fact that Kid has 
never had any physical, sexual contact with human skin other than his own. But 
he is addicted to internet pornography, an addiction he developed at age eleven 
to fill the emptiness of his early adolescent existence: “watching pornography 
and masturbating were the only times he felt real.”172 He watched internet 
pornography for hours each day beginning in middle school and throughout his 
adolescence.173 Kid was largely abandoned by his family, living with his single 
mother who left him alone for days at a time while she was off with various 
boyfriends. He describes his childhood in terms of a deadening isolation and 
social disconnection, finding respite only in online pornography, which was 
more readily available to him than other forms of social engagement.174 
Kid’s addiction to pornography and the punishment he ultimately suffers 
for distributing pornography in the military underscore the strange coexistence 
of the mass availability of pornography, often free of charge on the internet, 
alongside the arbitrary, episodic, extraordinarily punitive reactions to certain 
instances of pornography’s circulation and consumption. Kid’s story is neither 
anti-porn, nor pro-porn, but what Kid’s experience makes clear is that it is not 
pornography that has led him to his current predicament—despite its 
pervasiveness and the arbitrary regulation of it—but the absence of socially 
connected engagement with his family, at school, or the military, which he 
joins in the hope of finding community before he is forced to leave. 
Lost Memory of Skin begins with Kid’s first visit to a library. Never 
having entered a library before his conviction, Kid enters a library for the first 
time to look up his own identity in an online database of sex offenders.175 In 
narrating this visit to the library, Banks elucidates not just the irrationality of 
the residency restrictions as a crime control measure—Kid “can’t remember 
there being any rules specifically against entering [a library] . . . . And children 
and teenagers probably come in here all the time”176—but also Kid’s social 
disconnection. It was this social disconnection that resulted ultimately in Kid’s 
arrest, when he was presumably chatting online with a law enforcement agent, 
“brandi18,” who invited him to her home, first telling him she was eighteen and 
later conveying she was fourteen. This would have been Kid’s first date. 
Yet, even as Kid must live effectively on the street for the remainder of 
his life, presumably to prevent him from harming children, he may visit a 
public library. Or at least he thinks he may do so as long as it is not 
denominated in the residency restrictions as “a place where children 
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congregate,” whoever its actual users may be.177 
Banks hauntingly portrays both the strange construction of Kid’s identity 
as a “sex offender” and the perilous ostracism he experiences through the 
enforcement of the residential restrictions and other sex offender regulatory 
measures, including a GPS ankle bracelet that Kid is required to wear to 
monitor his compliance. Through his monitor bracelet, Banks writes, “the Kid 
feels intimately connected to the millions of other convicted sex offenders 
young and old and in-between, rapists and child abusers and men who exposed 
their genitals . . . men who talked dirty in Internet chat rooms . . . porn 
addicts . . .” as he imagines they are all “trembling leaves on the branches large 
and small of a vast electrical tree that casts its shadow across the entire 
country.”178 This is the first sense of social connection that Kid experiences, 
one that unites him with people who have violently raped and to others who, 
like Kid, committed nonviolent, minor offenses, but who all experience a form 
of social banishment that makes it difficult to exist outside of this identity 
assignment and the degradation it entails. In Banks’s telling, though, this 
constructed identity and forced estrangement is no more harmful to Kid than 
the isolation of his youth, brought about similarly by the absence of social 
engagement. Through Kid’s story, Banks exposes part of how the residential 
restrictions mischaracterize the problem of sexual harm as one that can be 
resolved by removing certain, presumably pathological, individuals from 
existing social structures rather than by addressing the social institutional 
conditions associated with targeted forms of sexual harm in the first instance. 
Banks focuses, in particular, on the institutions of the family, school, and 
the military. First, Banks explores Kid’s family and school, the spaces of his 
early life. Kid is so socially dislocated—both before his conviction and after—
that life feels to him unreal, “not quite dead but not alive either.”179 Still, Kid 
does not blame his largely absent mother or anything particularly horrible in his 
upbringing for his plight. In fact, Kid is ultimately at a loss as to how to explain 
it. Instead, Banks simply makes plain the absence of any mode of integration 
that connects Kid in any way to others—whether through his family, or school, 
or when he joins the military. Kid’s addiction to pornography deepens in the 
military, because as he describes it, “Everybody’s into porn, even the 
officers. . . . It’s practically un-American not to be into porn.”180 Kid relates 
that “like all the guys in my outfit, I watched porn all the time on my 
computer.”181 But U.S. military personnel cannot “distribute porn.”182 Kid 
remarks on the precariousness of this distinction: “You can collect and swap 
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skin magazines with your buddies. You can watch porn videos and share them 
with your homies. . . . But if you’re U.S. military personnel you can’t like 
distribute porn. . . . Which is a pretty fine distinction, if you ask me. Between 
consuming and distributing. You can be one but not the other.”183 Kid is at the 
bottom of his unit’s hierarchy and “from the first day of basic guys gave me a 
lot of shit.”184 In order to endear himself to the men in his unit, Kid buys porn 
DVDs for the other men when he is off base one night; the following day there 
is a raid, and Kid is discharged from the military for distributing 
pornography.185 
Ultimately, when Kid goes to meet “brandi18” by bus in the Florida 
exurbs after being discharged from the military, he is not sure whether he is 
engaging in fantasy or reality—that distinction, just like the one between 
consuming and distributing pornography, has become thoroughly blurred for 
him. Banks makes evident that the blurring is not caused by porn, or even really 
by the law enforcement agent “brandi18”’s misleading internet seduction, but is 
produced by Kid’s social seclusion. After his conviction, Kid’s dislocation is 
heightened by homelessness—his disconnection concrete and dramatized—but 
his dislocation is both the cause and the effect of his predicament. 
Kid, like thousands of actual youths in the United States, will be a 
registered sex offender for life. Kid explains, “I only got to wear this electronic 
foot collar for ten. But even when I get to take it off I’ll still be on the fucking 
registry for the rest of my life. I’ll still be homeless and living under the 
Causeway or someplace like it that’s more than twenty-five hundred feet from 
wherever there are kids gathered. . . . That’s my fate, I’m pretty sure.”186 
Through Kid’s story, Lost Memory of Skin dramatizes the 
unemployability, social isolation, and desperation of convicted sex offenders, 
as Banks also foregrounds a related pathology experienced by “us” not 
“them”—a social unraveling in the fabric of our urban spaces, our educational 
institutions, families, and military. This is a disconnection that also permits 
inurement to the cruelty and inefficacy of our criminal law’s response to 
persons with sex-related convictions, to survivors of sexual violence, and 
ultimately desensitization to the actual contours of sexual harm, social injustice, 
and their pervasiveness. 
Accordingly, in many urban jurisdictions, sex offender residential 
restrictions render those subject to them homeless, because there is nowhere 
one can live or work in city limits while complying with the restrictions.187 As 
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187. See Geraghty, supra note 151; Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended 
Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registry Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 531, 532–34 
(2007); Vick, supra note 150. 
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with community notification requirements, socially ostracizing and physically 
banishing convicted sex offenders removes informally surveillant, socially 
integrative mechanisms (such as employment or neighborhood oversight) that 
are known generally to reduce crime.188 
D. Monitoring and Sanctions 
Beyond registration, notification, and residency restrictions, convicted sex 
offenders are subject to an array of additional forms of monitoring as well as 
sanctions for failure to comply with surveillance measures.189 These measures, 
too, entail draconian and counterproductive effects. 
Even if convicted persons are prone to reoffend, the means by which 
registered offenders are monitored in many jurisdictions are predicated on 
pseudoscience that does not accurately predict future offending. Penile 
plethysmograph testing provides a particularly invasive example of 
simultaneous dehumanization and inefficacy as applied to convicted sex 
offenders. A penile plethysmograph is an arousal test, which involves “placing 
a pressure-sensitive device around a man’s penis, presenting him with an array 
of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual attraction 
by measuring minute changes in his erectile responses.”190 In U.S. v. Weber, 
Judge Marsha Berzon, writing for a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, explained the disturbing character of penile plethysmograph 
testing—widely used in monitoring persons with sex offense convictions—in 
terms that merit quoting at length: 
Although one would expect to find a description of such a procedure 
gracing the pages of a George Orwell novel rather than the Federal 
Reporter, plethysmograph testing has become routine in the treatment 
of sexual offenders and is often imposed as a condition of supervised 
release. . . . 
Prior to beginning the test, the subject is typically given instructions 
about what the procedure entails. He is then asked to place the device 
on his penis and is instructed to become fully aroused, either via self-
stimulation or by the presentation of so-called “warm-up stimuli,” in 
order to derive a baseline against which to compare later erectile 
measurements. After the individual returns to a state of detumescence, 
he is presented with various erotic and non-erotic stimuli. He is 
instructed to let himself become aroused in response to any of the 
materials that he finds sexually exciting. These stimuli come in one of 
three modalities—slides, film/video clips, and auditory vignettes—
though in some cases different types of stimuli are presented 
 
188. See, e.g., Sampson & Wilson, supra note 166; Sampson et al., Does Marriage Reduce 
Crime?, supra note 166; Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime, supra note 166.  
189. See LEON, supra note 2, at 134–35. 
190. Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and Perversity: The Use of Penile Plethysmography on 
Convicted Child Sex Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
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simultaneously. The materials depict individuals of different ages and 
genders—in some cases even possessing different anatomical 
features—and portray sexual scenarios involving varying degrees of 
coercion. The stimuli may be presented for periods of varying length—
from mere seconds to four minutes or longer.  
Changes in penile dimension are recorded after the presentation of 
each stimulus.  
Initially developed by Czech psychiatrist Kurt Freund as a means to 
study sexual deviance, plethysmograph testing was also at one time 
used by the Czechoslovakian government to identify and “cure” 
homosexuals. Today, plethysmograph testing has become rather 
routine in adult sexual offender treatment programs, with one survey 
noting that approximately one-quarter of adult sex offender programs 
employ the procedure. . . . 
It is true that cavity searches and strip searches are deeply invasive, but 
[plethysmograph testing] is substantially more invasive. Cavity 
searches do not involve the minute monitoring of changes in the size 
and shape of a person’s genitalia. Nor do such searches last anywhere 
near the two or three hours required for penile plethysmography 
exams. Nor do cavity or strip searches require a person to become 
sexually aroused, or to engage in sexual self-stimulation. . . . 
A reasonable finder of fact could conclude that requiring the 
plethysmograph involves a substantive due process violation. The 
procedure, from all that appears, is hardly routine. One does not have 
to cultivate particularly delicate sensibilities to believe degrading the 
process of having a strain gauge strapped to an individual’s genitals 
while sexually explicit pictures are displayed in an effort to determine 
his sexual arousal patterns. The procedure involves bodily 
manipulation of the most intimate sort. There has been no showing 
regarding the procedure’s reliability and, in light of other 
psychological evaluative tools available, there has been no 
demonstration that other less intrusive means of obtaining the relevant 
information are not sufficient.191 
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., in his concurrence in U.S. v. Weber, went 
further still in condemning the procedure: 
[T]he Orwellian procedure at issue . . . [is] always a violation of the 
personal dignity of which prisoners are not deprived. The procedure 
violates a prisoner’s bodily integrity by affecting his genitals. The 
procedure violates a prisoner’s mental integrity by intruding images 
into his brain. The procedure violates a prisoner’s moral integrity by 
requiring him to masturbate. 
By committing a crime and being convicted of it, a person does not 
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cease to be a person. A prisoner is not a mere tool of the state to be 
manipulated by it to achieve the purposes the law has determined 
appropriate in punishment. The prisoner retains his humanity and 
therefore has purposes transcending those of the state. A prisoner, for 
example, cannot be forced into prostitution to aid the state in securing 
evidence. A prisoner, for example, cannot be made to perjure himself 
in order to assist a prosecution. Similarly, a prisoner should not be 
compelled to stimulate himself sexually in order for the government to 
get a sense of his current proclivities. There is a line at which the 
government must stop. Penile plethysmography testing crosses it.192 
The Court struck down the application of the plethysmograph in 
Webster’s individual case on statutory and procedural grounds, though 
Webster’s lawyer neglected to raise a substantive due process challenge. Quite 
apart from the specific result in this case, the opinions in Webster illuminate 
how plethysmograph testing transgresses widely held expectations of humane 
conduct of the criminal process. As with residential restrictions, this form of 
testing is morally condemnable in cases involving youthful offenders in light of 
their relative innocence, immaturity, and reduced culpability, as well as to 
adults convicted of minor offenses. But it is not just its overbroad application 
that is the source of injustice. There are lines of degradation and cruelty that 
criminal sanctions, especially collateral sanctions, ought not to cross even for 
more serious offenses. Many of the regulatory techniques applied to sex 
offenders, including plethysmograph testing, are indefensibly invasive and 
dehumanizing. 
In addition to its degrading invasiveness, penile plethysmograph testing is 
an unreliable predictor of an individual’s likelihood to perpetrate sexual 
harm.193 Studies of the link between arousal and activity strongly suggest that 
persons are often aroused in ways that do not at all predict their sexual activity, 
and persons convicted of or prone to more serious offenses may seek to mask 
unconventional forms of arousal.194 Simply put, plethysmograph testing 
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the reliability of phallometric testing, such as plethysmograph testing). 
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purports to predict sexual activity on the basis of arousal, but the link between 
arousal and activity is complex and tenuous at best.195 One may have sexually 
stimulating fantasies that one never acts on or that are played out only in 
consensual fantasy contexts, such as adult role play. Further, sexual violence 
may be perpetrated out of a desire to exercise power and domination over 
others in ways that are not primarily about sexual arousal or satisfaction.196 
More broadly, the connection between serious psychological research and 
correctional systems is extremely limited. The work of psychiatrists and 
psychologists in corrections is resource strapped and largely practice based; and 
an array of paraprofessionals has emerged to meet the significant demand for 
sex offender monitoring.197 These paraprofessionals often have limited training 
and very few conduct research or have academic affiliations.198 In order to 
monitor convicted sex offenders, the paraprofessionals deploy tests that include 
invasive technologies of questionable reliability, including but not limited to 
penile plethysmographs and polygraphs.199 
The harmful and counterproductive effects of notification, residential 
restrictions, and pseudoscientific testing are all the more condemnable because 
sanctions for failure to comply with these restrictions and requirements are 
severe, even punishable as felonies in many jurisdictions.200 Prison sentences 
for noncompliance may be lengthy, as in this case of a convicted sex offender 
in Texas: 
I was homeless—I went to two homeless shelters—told them the 
truth—I was a registered sex offender—I could not stay. . . . The 3rd 
shelter I went to—I did not tell them. I was allowed to stay. November 
2002 I was to register again—my birthday. If I told them I lived at a 
shelter—I would be thrown out—if I stayed on the streets I would not 
have a [sic] address to give—violation. So I registered under my old 
address—the empty house, which was too close to a school. Someone 
called the police—I told them I did not live at that address anymore—I 
was locked up, March 2003. I was given a 10-year sentence for failure 
to register as a sex offender.201 
These sanctions of lengthy imprisonment for failure to register even apply 
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to persons whose convictions or juvenile adjudications occurred when they 
were still minors. In one case, Lucas W. was adjudicated delinquent at age 
seventeen of aggravated sexual assault for having consensual sex with his 
younger girlfriend, though he later married her. He was subsequently arrested 
for failure to register and was sentenced to ten years in prison.202 
Some facing these harsh carceral consequences were even younger at the 
time they were adjudicated: Ethan A. was eleven years old when he was 
accused by his stepmother of touching the genitals of his infant sister and his 
younger brother.203 His first photograph for the registry was taken when he was 
thirteen years old. After Ethan A.’s release from juvenile detention, he worked 
hard to turn his life around, finding employment in an auto body shop to help 
his mother pay the bills and beginning a romantic relationship with a young 
woman in his community. Ultimately, though, when his employer learned of 
his registration status, he was fired. Several months later when Ethan A. went 
for his registration verification he was arrested for not reporting he had lost his 
job. Registered offenders in many states may be prosecuted for failure to 
provide notice of change of place of employment. Ethan A. was convicted of 
this felony offense and sentenced to three years incarceration.204 
Even when the prosecution relates to sexual harm within the family, such 
as the sexual abuse of which Ethan A. was accused, the uniform application of 
extraordinarily punitive measures blurs the line between violent sexual abuse 
and children’s behavior that may be socially inappropriate, harmful, and 
sexually-oriented, but relatively non-dangerous. This uniform treatment in 
collateral carceral sanctions is misguided, among other reasons, because it fails 
to attend to differences in culpability between the sort of behavior of which 
Ethan A. was accused and adult rape of children. Additionally, uniform 
treatment of a broad spectrum of offenses may increase the stigma and 
reporting fears of the survivor of childhood genital touching. By constructing 
relatively minor offenses as deserving of extreme punishment, these practices 
may also increase the likelihood that the experience will be remembered as 
especially painful and traumatic rather than inappropriate and unwanted but not 
permanently damaging.205 Further, if the young victims are aware that their 
siblings or parents would face lifelong punitive sanctions, this could lead to a 
decline in reporting of offending behavior. 
The excessive harshness and overbreadth of monitoring and sanctioning 
measures also raise legitimacy concerns that could impact law enforcement 
efficacy, because repeated studies have shown that perceived legitimacy 
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substantially influences rule-abiding behavior.206 A significant majority of 
convicted sex offenders perceive the overbreadth and harshness of the 
prevailing criminal regulatory regime to be illegitimate. In one survey of 
convicted sex offenders, 75 percent responded that they did not view the 
notification and registration requirements as a deterrent to future offending, and 
most responded that they perceived these laws to be “unfair.”207 One convicted 
sex offender explained, 
When people see my picture on the state sex offender registry they 
assume I am a pedophile. I have been called a baby rapist by my 
neighbors; feces have been left on my driveway; a stone with a note 
wrapped around it telling me to “watch my back” was thrown through 
my window, almost hitting a guest. What the registry doesn’t tell 
people is that I was convicted at age 17 of sex with my 14-year-old 
girlfriend, that I have been offense-free for over a decade, that I have 
completed my therapy, and that the judge and my probation officer 
didn’t even think I was at risk of reoffending. My life is in ruins, not 
because I had sex as a teenager, and not because I was convicted, but 
because of how my neighbors have reacted to the information on the 
Internet.208 
Another convicted offender relays that, 
The rules are humiliating—a constant reminder. It’s hard to, in a 
manner of speaking, to move on and try to put things behind when 
you’re constantly reminded by the rules that you are a sex offender and 
the rules more or less make you feel like it just happened 
yesterday. . . . The rules don’t allow you to have a normal life and the 
rules are a constant reminder that you’re not a normal person.209 
Yet another convicted sex offender explicitly conveyed that he believed 
that the restrictions may lead him or others to engage in new criminal behavior: 
What they do to sex offenders now, I mean, I understand the intentions 
behind it, but what it really does with all the reporting, the money, the 
PO’s watching everything, the list [community notification], in many 
respects I think it is overkill and it has the potential to push people to 
that point where they re-offend.210 
At a minimum, as a consequence of perceived unfairness, compliance is 
likely to be undermined insofar as perceptions of legitimacy impact compliance 
with the law. These problems relating to criminogenesis are compounded by 
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the dehumanizing and unreliable character of the restrictions and monitoring to 
which convicted sex offenders are subject, even those convicted of relatively 
minor, sometimes even victimless crimes.211 
Apart from perceptions of illegitimacy, as noted earlier, the best available 
evidence suggests that notification requirements that make life especially 
onerous for persons convicted of sex offenses are likely to be criminogenic as 
they render it harder to obtain lawful employment and otherwise form social 
attachments that inhibit antisocial and criminalized conduct.212 Any deterrent 
effect of these sanctions must be assessed in light of the violence and 
intolerance they visit on the lives of persons, including those adjudicated as 
children, who ought to be treated with some regard for their dignity as human 
beings. 
These monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms also reinforce a conception 
of regulating sexual harm that focuses on individuals rather than on 
institutional practices that are conducive to pervasive sexual abuse, pseudo-
scientific tests instead of more reliable predictive indications of instability and 
threat, and an overall mismatch between the behaviors to be regulated and the 
techniques used. These monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are thus 
productive of misguided regulatory strategies and distract attention from 
macro-level social institutional reform efforts that might better limit risks of 
sexual violence and abuse. 
E. Civil Commitment 
Following a criminal sentence, a small number of sex offenders may be 
civilly committed in a secure facility similar to a prison but for its civil 
designation.213 By 2007, twenty states and the federal government had enacted 
new civil commitment provisions that permit indefinite detention of convicted 
sex offenders after they have completed their sentence if they are deemed 
dangerous.214 
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In his book Failure to Protect, Eric Janus demonstrates that though 
relatively few convicted sex offenders are civilly committed, the process and 
standards governing commitment are such that the confinement is often 
indefinite.215 In particular, though state practices with regard to civil 
commitment vary considerably, once one is committed, the determination of 
dangerousness is difficult to contest because it is predicated on future 
propensities rather than conduct one has undertaken.216 Between 1990 and 
2007, there were approximately 2,700 sex offenders civilly committed, of 
whom only approximately 250 had been released.217 Those who obtained 
release did so largely on the basis of technicalities rather than sentence 
completion.218 
There are numerous troubling questions surrounding civil commitment 
practices. First, the fact that so few individuals are ever released from 
commitment suggests that civil commitment has become a “civil” shadow 
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system for life sentencing in the sex offense context.219 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, a study focused on public support for civil commitment provisions 
found that respondents supported civil commitment as an extension of an 
offender’s punishment primarily in those instances where a convicted offender 
was perceived to have received too lenient a punishment, irrespective of the 
risk of recidivism.220 This violates basic principles of criminal liability, 
eschewing values of proportionality in sentencing and effectively punishing 
persons for conduct of which they have not been criminally tried and convicted. 
There is also marked variation and irregularity in the administration of 
civil commitment beyond its function as masked punishment for crimes a 
person is believed to be at risk of committing but has not yet committed. In one 
multi-state analysis of persons civilly committed as sexual predators, the 
authors found that in certain states—Washington, Florida and Wisconsin—
committed sex offenders exhibited high levels of risk on the applicable risk 
assessment instruments, whereas in Nebraska, committed persons reflected far 
lower levels of risk.221 The authors concluded that “when civil commitment 
dispositions appear to be based on something other than an empirically 
supported understanding of risk, it reduces confidence that the balance is being 
struck wisely.”222 
A separate concern is that the financial cost of confining someone 
“civilly” for life—rather than in prison, following a full hearing, with 
appropriate procedural protections—is exorbitant.223 New York spent 
approximately $175,000 per committed person in 2010, with the national 
average running about $96,000 per year, not including legal expenses.224 
California’s 2007 budget for civil commitment was over $147 million.225 
Whereas it costs $110,000 per year to “civilly” confine a “sexually violent 
offender” in Arizona, the cost per year per prison inmate is $20,564; the 
difference in Pennsylvania is between $150,000 and $32,304.226 
Even though the civil commitment framework is enormously resource-
intensive, it provides little meaningful therapy or other intervention. Lawyers 
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might well advise civilly committed persons not to attend therapy while 
detained, and not to engage frankly and openly in treatment, because 
misconduct admitted in that context could imperil their eventual release or 
result in new criminal charges.227 In any case, most committed individuals 
never leave.228 
*** 
For all of these reasons the predominant U.S. post-conviction regime for 
regulating sexual offending is overbroad, ineffectual, inefficient, and likely 
criminogenic—exacerbating the social and individual pathologies it purports to 
address and neglecting the locations and institutional pathologies associated 
with the most prevalent sexual harms. This regulatory framework purports to 
address sexual harm, yet drains and misdirects law enforcement resources in a 
manner ill-suited to confronting prevalent forms of sexual violence and abuse. 
The regime is justified in popular and legal discourse on the grounds that it 
prevents future sexual harm, but it may well perpetuate more harm than it 
prevents or redresses. How, then, might this dysfunctional regime be reformed 
or substantially restrained? 
II. 
REVISING REGIMES OF EXCESSIVE CRIMINALIZATION AND PUNISHMENT 
This Part explores how advocates in jurisdictions across the United States 
have sought to scale back the overbreadth and misdirection of certain sex 
offense regulations, countering tendencies toward scapegoating dangerous 
strangers by characterizing the dominant sex offense regulatory regime as itself 
productive of threat.229 Advocates’ work in this domain may serve as a model 
for future efforts to reform regimes of criminal regulatory excess in other 
contexts by identifying the ways in which criminal law’s overreaching more 
generally threatens crucial shared values and social well-being, not only of 
those immediately impacted, but of all of us. 
In Georgia, the Southern Center for Human Rights organized a major 
effort to scale back the harshness of sex offense regulations by bringing a class 
action lawsuit on behalf of all persons in Georgia subject to the sex offender 
registry and residential restrictions.230 The Southern Center chose a lead 
plaintiff in the case, Wendy Whitaker, who captured pointedly the threats of 
overbreadth and excessive harshness imposed by the restrictions. Whitaker, 
now in her thirties, became subject to the residential restrictions and risked 
losing her home because she engaged in a single act of consensual oral sex with 
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a fifteen-year-old boy in her high school class at the age of seventeen.231 At the 
time, Whitaker pled guilty to sodomy and completed five years of probation, 
but the Georgia law required her to register as a sex offender and prohibited her 
from residing within 1,000 feet of a place where children congregate.232 
In response to publicity generated by the lawsuit—much of it sympathetic 
to Whitaker’s disconcerting story—the Georgia legislature enacted a law to 
permit certain designated sex offenders, such as persons whose offenses are 
now considered misdemeanors, to petition a Superior Court judge to obtain 
release from the registry.233 The legislative reform also removed retroactive 
application of residential restrictions, so that these restrictions no longer apply 
to the 13,000 or so registered sex offenders in the state who were convicted 
before June 4, 2003.234 Advocates achieved these preliminary successes in 
Georgia not only by emphasizing the insecurity that the registry and restrictions 
create for sympathetic, non-dangerous persons like Whitaker, but also by 
selecting a plaintiff who called attention to the threat the overbreadth of the sex 
offender regulatory regime may pose to anyone. Additionally, advocates 
pointed to the threat to public safety created by the enforcement of registry and 
residential restrictions, which unnecessarily drain law enforcement 
resources.235 
The ultimate victory in the Georgia Supreme Court, striking down the 
harshest form of the Georgia residency restriction, came in a separate case, 
Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections, which called attention to the 
threat to property rights inherent in the restrictions.236 In that case—brought by 
a forty-five year old man who was ordered to vacate a recently purchased home 
due to a conviction of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child in 2002—the 
Georgia Supreme Court found that the residency restriction constituted a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
government taking of his property.237 In celebrating the victory in Mann, 
attorney Sarah Geraghty of the Southern Center for Human Rights relayed, 
“What this decision says is we value property rights and the legislature cannot 
simply snatch them away.”238 This framing of residency restrictions as a threat 
to property rights proved successful before the Georgia Supreme Court as a 
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manner of narrowing the overbreadth of sex offender restrictions, whatever its 
other political and legal connotations. 
Threats to state budgets in times of relative economic austerity have also 
motivated some states to depart even from federally mandated sex offense 
regulatory requirements under the Adam Walsh Act, which conditions federal 
funds on states’ establishment of systems for registration and reregistration of 
persons convicted of sex offenses.239 Multiple states have declined to comply 
with the Adam Walsh Act and every state that has compared the price of 
compliance against the price of noncompliance has determined that 
noncompliance better serves their financial interests—the federal funds 
potentially sacrificed are more than recouped by not having to expend 
resources on the registry and associated enforcement processes.240 In short, the 
threat of tightening state budgets outweighed other incentives to participate in 
the federally promoted framework. 
In Ohio, reform to certain sex offense regulatory measures came about as 
public defenders filed hundreds of challenges to a requirement that courts 
reclassify all registered sex offenders according to their conviction offense, 
rather than, as had previously been the case, on the basis of a more holistic 
assessment.241 Complying with this requirement would have involved a 
substantial allocation of court resources and undoubtedly the challenges 
summoned to mind the threat of depletion of scarce court resources to make 
possible the reclassifications: the statute at issue required reclassification of 
26,000 registered offenders in the state.242 Greene County Prosecutor Stephen 
K. Haller explained, “It’s a mess. . . . To me it’s an example of nonlawyers 
trying to pass legislation just because it’s today’s hot topic.”243 Ultimately, in 
response to lawsuits brought by public defenders challenging the 
reclassification, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the reclassification 
requirements violated the separation of powers doctrine of the Ohio 
Constitution.244 
More recently, advocates in Ohio succeeded in persuading the Ohio 
Supreme Court to strike down altogether lifetime registration requirements for 
individuals placed on the registry as juveniles on the ground that this was cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions.245 Of course, 
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in focusing efforts on juveniles, advocates concentrated attention on a 
population already understood as relatively innocent, vulnerable, and less 
readily susceptible to scapegoating. Still, by emphasizing the cruel and unusual 
nature of lifetime registration requirements, and also by demonstrating the 
threat to core values and rule of law principles, advocates ultimately persuaded 
the Ohio Supreme Court that the juvenile registration provisions “shock the 
sense of justice of the community.”246 
In a particularly unexpected turn of events, the application of the sex 
offense laws to young people even led Mark Lunsford, the father of rape and 
murder victim Jessica Lunsford, the namesake of Jessica’s Laws, to speak out 
against overbroad application of sex offense regulatory measures.247 This came 
to pass when the laws threatened his own son.248 Joshua Lunsford, then 
eighteen, was arrested for kissing a fourteen-year-old girl.249 This alleged 
conduct, if proven, would have constituted criminal child sexual abuse in 
Ohio.250 The girl’s mother reported the incident to the police.251 Mark Lunsford 
commented to the Tampa Tribune: “We’re talking about Romeo and Juliet 
here, not some 36-year-old pervert following around a 10-year-old.”252 The 
threat to loved ones, especially the threat posed by the overbreadth of the sex 
offense regulatory regime as applied to youth, has motivated even one of the 
most staunch proponents of these laws—a parent of a child victim—to 
reconsider their advisability. 
In New Mexico, advocates partnered with another parent and victims’ 
rights proponent who initially supported passage of the sex offender registry 
laws. The former proponent had become concerned that the overbreadth of the 
registration laws was a threat to more general law enforcement objectives.253 
As described in Part I, California’s sex offender residency restrictions 
have also been subject to a substantial and partially effective series of 
challenges, not by survivors or their families, but by convicted sex offender 
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parolees and their advocates, calling attention to the constitutional and legal 
threats posed by regulatory overreach. Persons subject to the sex offender 
registry in San Diego County, California brought suit challenging the residency 
restrictions on the basis of violations to their “right to intrastate travel, their 
right to establish a home and their right to privacy” and alleging the restriction 
“was not narrowly drawn and specifically tailored to the individual 
circumstances of each sex offender parolee.”254 The blanket application without 
individualized consideration of residency restrictions was enjoined by the court 
and upheld on appeal in an opinion that notes throughout the threat to core 
constitutional principles posed by the blanket application of the residency 
restrictions.255 At the time of this writing, an appeal is pending in the California 
Supreme Court.256 
Along these lines, in Georgia, Ohio, New Mexico, and California, 
advocates worked with public defenders, prosecutors, victims’ rights 
proponents, and legislators to call attention to the threats posed by the 
governing criminal regulatory regime and the values undermined by the various 
restrictions.257 Advocates underscored the threats to sympathetic, 
nonthreatening individuals like Wendy Whitaker, juvenile offenders in the 
Ohio case, to the rule of law, to property rights, to other core constitutional 
commitments, to public safety, to state budgets, and to law enforcement 
broadly in the face of resource constraints.258 This reformist approach marshals 
political emotion by implicitly directing attention to the danger posed by the 
criminal regulatory status quo—a threat that may be perceived to outweigh the 
threat associated with targeted scapegoated sex offenders. This framing of the 
threat of criminal law’s excessive harshness and overbreadth might be similarly 
marshaled in other criminal law enforcement contexts from drug law 
enforcement to public order maintenance arrests targeting various 
misdemeanors that carry harsh and costly consequences.259 Insofar as 
scapegoating of stranger sexual predators is largely sustained by perceived 
threat, this approach counters those processes by demonstrating how the status 
quo actually produces significant insecurity. 
The successes of advocates targeting the excesses and overbreadth of sex 
offense regulations are significant, though their achievements should not be 
over-stated as the victories remain relatively limited and piecemeal in the face 
of a major continuing commitment to the status quo in sex offense regulation 
among political and legal actors and the public. Further, though advocates have 
 
254. See Bailey, supra note 44. 
255. Id. 
256. See In re Taylor, 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013). 
257. See LEON, supra note 2, at 193–94. 
258. See id. 
259. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 611, 611 (2014) (exploring how mass criminal misdemeanor processing “sort[s] and regulate[s] 
the populations targeted”). 
 2014] REGULATING SEXUAL HARM 1605 
succeeded in provoking outrage at criminal regulatory overbreadth, the 
downscaling of particular forms of punitive excess in response to minor sex-
related offenses does not provide better approaches to pervasive but under-
attended forms of sexual harm, nor does it offer a way beyond indefinite civil 
confinement of persons convicted of serious crimes. 
Beginning to move beyond a direct identification of competing threats, 
and to gesture towards a different framework within which to understand 
sexual harm, Patty Wetterling, the mother of child victim Jacob Wetterling—
after whom the federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act is named260—has opposed invoking her 
son’s tragic kidnapping and disappearance as an occasion for unreasoned 
punitiveness. Wetterling is, she explained, “tired of tough. Everybody wants to 
out-tough the next legislator. ‘I’m tough on crime,’ ‘No, I’m even more 
tough.’”261 In Wetterling’s words, “People want a silver bullet that will protect 
their children, [but] there is no silver bullet. There is no simple cure to the very 
complex problem of sexual violence.”262 
The following Part will begin to explore whether and how macro-level 
preventive measures focused on social institutional, structural, and discursive 
reform might serve to more meaningfully address this complex problem. 
III. 
REIMAGINING THE REGULATION OF SEXUAL HARM 
The goal of this Part is to consider a range of preventive institutional, 
structural, and discursive responses concentrated on those locations where 
sexual harm is most pervasive. The sections that follow will consider how a 
preferable preventive framework for responding to sexual violence and abuse 
might focus on increasing accountability and transparency in institutions that 
are frequent sites of abuse and flattening hierarchies of power and privilege that 
produce particular vulnerability to sexual harm. Increased attention to and 
understanding of those institutions, relationships, and vulnerabilities would 
inform on an ongoing basis the content of further reform. 
A social institutional reformist framework consists of institutional policy-
focused, infrastructural design, and more general discursive and social 
dimensions. Such a framework would attend to institutional policy formation 
and physical infrastructural design so as to reduce risks of and opportunities for 
sexual assault. Relatedly, the expansion of modes of institutional and 
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interpersonal redress in the aftermath of sexual assault would make available 
forms of recourse that are more attractive to survivors of abuse by intimates 
than the prevailing criminal regime. Shifting institutional polices to address 
forms of inequality that create vulnerability to harm is likewise critical. A 
meaningful social institutional reform framework would also confront taboos 
by openly discussing the realities of sex and sexual abuse, the power 
relationships that sustain those taboos, and facilitate more open and less 
repressive discourse about sex and power generally. It is these repressive 
dynamics that underlie so much of what is wrong in current practices regarding 
sexual harm. This framework would reserve conventional prosecutorial and 
punishment resources for those few sexual offenses that are most egregious, 
where no other response to sexual violence seems plausible at present. A 
macro-level preventive institutional focus along these lines would thus 
circumvent many of the violations of rights and infringements of fundamental 
rule of law and humanitarian principles entailed by focusing on individual 
targeted deterrence through preventive quasi-punishments. 
My aim here, of course, is not to explore in depth what such an alternative 
framework might entail or to address its reformist potential in full. But this Part 
will preliminarily identify some of this framework’s parameters, limits, and 
possibilities as a competing, alternative regulatory approach—and more 
fundamentally, as an alternative means of conceptualizing how to undertake 
some of the social regulatory work currently all too often carried out through 
criminal law enforcement.263 This Part will move from the most specific and 
potentially realizable social institutional reforms to the most ambitious 
structural and social shifts that would be necessary to more fully and humanely 
grapple with sexual harm. 
A. Social Institutional Reform 
There are various social institutional reform measures that could function 
to prevent sexual harm by restructuring institutional reporting and response 
policies, reducing secrecy around sexual abuse (which would begin to 
transform associated institutional power dynamics), and increasing meaningful 
monitoring of institutions afflicted by widespread sexual violence. Given that 
much sexual abuse takes place in the military, schools, prisons, churches, and 
the family, rather than at the hands of dangerous strangers, it is critical to 
address the specific institutional practices that produce pervasive sexual abuse 
in these locations. 
Institutional policies perpetuate sexual violence where members of those 
institutions—students, servicemembers, prisoners, parishioners—are not able to 
seek assistance from an independent party tasked with sensitively responding to 
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violence and abuse and where other institutional practices subtly condone, or 
even facilitate, the violence in question. Although there is often marked 
institutional resistance to shifting internal policies of this sort, reform may 
become more feasible as the institutional policies in question are increasingly 
understood as themselves constitutive of sexual violence, and as individualized 
prosecutorial targeting is recognized as a profoundly limited measure in these 
contexts, regardless of its efficacy (or inefficacy) in other settings. 
Sexual abuse, harassment, and violence in educational settings provide a 
first case in point: sexual harm in schools, colleges, and universities is 
sustained in significant part by institutional reporting policies and other 
institutional practices that simultaneously dissuade reporting, fail to respond to 
actual ongoing harm, and excuse and even subsidize institutional contexts 
associated with violence.264 According to the 2014 Report of the White House 
Task Force to Protect Students From Sexual Assault, 20 percent of female 
college students experience sexual assault while in college.265 Numerous 
educational institutions are under federal investigation for their treatment of 
sexual assault cases, including Princeton, Harvard, Ohio State, and Florida 
State Universities.266 The problems giving rise to the investigations at these 
institutions are largely the nonresponse or extraordinarily insensitive response 
to numerous student complaints of rape, assault, and abuse. 
One obvious cause of this nonresponse is the lack of independence and 
meaningful accountability of the school disciplinary boards, where 
administrators overseeing the process are not truly serving autonomously but 
are simultaneously interested in upholding the reputation of the school and 
hence minimizing negative reputational consequences that would follow from a 
report of sexual violence on campus.267 Compounding this problem, 
disciplinary panels are generally not trained to properly address the sensitive 
subject matter at issue. For instance, one Columbia University disciplinary 
panel member asked a student reporting anal rape how forced anal sex as 
described by the student would be physically possible without lubrication.268 
This absence of independence coupled with such insensitivity dissuades 
reporting and conveys the distinct impression that the institution is not 
committed to addressing sexual violence when it occurs.  
The Obama Administration has responded by mandating that colleges and 
universities lower the evidentiary threshold required for sanctions through 
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campus processes to a “preponderance of the evidence,” not the stricter “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard many colleges and universities use.269 But 
while this approach might result in more findings of guilt and more expulsions 
of accused students, it will not directly address the insensitivity and lack of 
independence of those involved in the process. Lowering the evidentiary 
threshold might well lead to an increase in punitive measures against 
perpetrators that could raise due process concerns, but would not cure the 
inadequacy of reporting and response processes at such institutions. 
To address the relevant problems, the body tasked with handling reporting 
in universities (as well as in prisons and the military) would need to be truly 
independent and competent to handle the subject matter before it. Requiring 
independence and competence are more likely to produce improved 
institutional results than lowering the evidentiary thresholds. 
Additionally, many survivors have little interest in harsh punitive 
consequences. Instead, they desire clear condemnation of the conduct and 
acknowledgment of the wrong, which suggests that the specific details of 
punishment outcomes and the evidentiary threshold producing them hold far 
less significance than a fair, independent, thoughtful process for restorative 
redress. Institutions could create such a restorative administrative process by 
investing resources in establishing an independent entity tasked with addressing 
sexual harm and sexual health on campuses. Also, presumably students who 
choose not to go through the criminal process, or to use the campus and 
criminal processes in tandem, seek a less conventionally punitive, formal mode 
of redress on campus. 
Crucial as well to the institutional role in sexual harm in this context, 
colleges and universities are known for their subtle acquiescence and subsidy 
of activities associated with sexual violence, particularly fraternity and other 
campus social environments with excessive use of alcohol and cultural norms 
that celebrate sexual violence.270 Universities and colleges should not 
necessarily prohibit such gatherings or student organizations, but nor should 
universities give substantial financial subsidy or tacit encouragement to these 
activities.271 At a minimum, there is an affirmative obligation, arguably even a 
 
269. See Pérez-Peña & Taylor, supra note 11; see also RUSSLYNN ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR 
CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTER ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 10–11 (2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/dear_colleague_sexual_violence.pdf (public 
letter to college presidents advocating for a preponderance of the evidence standard for school sexual 
assault cases in order to conform these proceedings to Title IX discrimination cases). 
270. See Olga Khazan, The Dark History of EI, The Latest Frat Accused of Rapey Emails, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/04/the-dark-history-of-ei 
-the-latest-rape-email-frat/361056/ (documenting many chilling remarks celebrating rape culture 
posted online by members of the Epsilon Iota fraternity at American University); see also Lorenzo 
Ferrigno, Wesleyan University Student Alleges Rape, Sues Fraternity, Members, Other Student,  
CNN (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/14/justice/wesleyan-university-rape-lawsuit/ 
(documenting the public rape of a Wesleyan student at a fraternity party). 
271. See Elizabeth A. Armstrong et al., Sexual Assault on Campus: A Multilevel, Integrative 
 2014] REGULATING SEXUAL HARM 1609 
legal responsibility contemplated by Title IX, on educational institutions to 
facilitate forms of social engagement separate from fraternities and other sites 
that are frequently sexually violent or at least sexually discriminatory social 
contexts.272 
Beyond universities and colleges, other institutions’ practices and 
reporting processes countenance dramatic power imbalances prone to sexual 
and other abuse, and then actively dissuade reporting. The U.S. military’s 
process of managing sexual assault reporting through the chain of command 
provides a case in point. From 2011 to 2012 alone, there were 26,000 reports of 
sexual abuse in the U.S. military.273 Still, much sexual misconduct in the 
military goes unreported due to fear of retaliation.274 The fact that the U.S. 
military retains sexual assault reporting within the chain of command means 
that a service member who has been assaulted by his or her superior officer 
may be instructed to report the offense to the officer who committed the assault 
and to rely on the assailant for any redress. 275 
The Invisible War, an award-winning and harrowing documentary film 
about rape in the U.S. military, reveals multiple instances of men and women 
being raped in the armed forces by the person in the chain of command to 
whom they were to report the incident.276 Yet, legislation aiming to take the 
investigation and prosecution of rape cases out of the military chain of 
command failed on the Senate floor in March 2014.277 An immediate remedy to 
the problem of widespread sexual violence and abuse in the military would be 
to take reporting out of the chain of command and to place reporting processes 
and investigation in a truly independent entity. 
Institutional policies that promote sexual secrecy and shame, especially 
those that sanction survivors of sexual abuse, ought also to be a target for 
preventive reform. The punitive response to persons who have endured rape 
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and other offenses in the U.S. military, and the now repealed “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell Policy” requiring sexual secrecy in the armed forces, serve as 
illustrative examples.278 In some instances, persons reporting sexual assault in 
the military have been court martialed for adultery.279 
Even absent direct sanctions against survivors such as adultery 
prosecutions, policies that promote secrecy surrounding sexual harm permit it 
to flourish in particularly damaging forms.280 Like “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 
retaining reporting of sexual assault and abuse in the chain of command sends 
an implicit message not to report when the assailant is a supervising officer or 
when the person to whom the victim is to report is a superior officer closely 
associated with the assailant. 
In one case that illustrates these problems and dynamics in the military 
context, Kole Welsch, a gay man who joined the military before the repeal of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” was violently raped by a superior male officer but 
kept the assault secret due to the insularity, shame, and punitiveness of the 
military’s policies regarding both disclosure of sexual orientation and reporting 
of sexual harm.281 Welsch first enlisted when he was seventeen years old to 
avoid being sent to a religious conversion camp by his homophobic parents. He 
served in Iraq honorably and returned after his tour of duty to study at an 
ROTC college program in the United States. At that time, Welsch met his 
partner, the two fell in love, and they began to build a life together among a 
community of other gay but closeted men in the service. One evening during 
this period, a Sergeant with whom both Welsch and his partner were acquainted 
invited the two young men over to his home. Welsch and his partner knew the 
Sergeant, like them, to be gay and closeted. The Sergeant served them beer 
laced with a drug that rendered both unconscious and he proceeded to violently 
rape both men, leaving them brutalized. 
After the assault, both Welsch and his partner were traumatized and 
 
278. See also JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY 
POLICY 2 (1999) (exploring how “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” generated more intense secrecy and 
suspicion around sexuality than an outright ban on gay service members, as military personnel, 
whether identified as “gay” or “straight,” worked to avoid exhibiting “conduct manifesting a 
propensity”). 
279. See, e.g., Radhika Sanghani, Military Rape: Fighting the Invisible War Inside the Armed 
Forces, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 10, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/ 
10678790/Military-rape-Fighting-the-invisible-war-inside-the-Armed-Forces.html (“Several of the 
victims were even charged with adultery after they reported the rapes, and the common theme for all 
the women was that the rape was bad—but the aftermath was just as bad, if not worse.”) 
280. See Jessica A. Turchik & Susan M. Wilson, Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military: A Review 
of the Literature and Recommendations for the Future, 15 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 267, 274 
(2010) (exploring “negative normative beliefs in the military (e.g., beliefs about gender, sex, and 
culture)” that contribute to sexual violence). 
281. See A Monster, Snap Judgment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 16, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/16/313138176/a-monster. The subtitle of this NPR episode asks, “A man 
does the unthinkable to Kole Welsch and his partner, Kevin. But who is the real monster? The man? 
Or the institution that allowed it to happen?” Id. (subtitle to the audio file). 
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devastated, but they chose to keep the rape and attack secret because Welsch 
wanted to become an officer and feared that outing himself would not only 
violate “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” but would also run afoul of the military’s 
policies that implicitly discouraged the reporting of sexual abuse. Both Welsch 
and his partner resolved to tell no one. But after a physical exam associated 
with a promotion within the service, Welsch was diagnosed with HIV, and he 
was told he could no longer serve because of his HIV status. He was 
discharged. Around this same time, Welsch learned that the Sergeant who had 
raped him was HIV positive. Welsch also learned that the same Sergeant was 
still pursuing young men, drugging them, and then infecting them with HIV; 
and this had happened to multiple other young gay men. 
Welsch decided then to report the crime, but the military Criminal 
Investigation Division informed him the attack had occurred off-base so they 
had no jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the Sergeant was transferred to a desk job and 
allowed to stay in the military even though he was HIV positive. 
Welsch described this experience in these terms: 
What happened to us was so traumatic. It literally damaged my mind. I 
wasn’t able to concentrate. I felt scattered. I had a tremor in my 
hands. . . . It took me a long time to come back from that. It took years 
of therapy. I just kept trying and trying and I wouldn’t give up. After 
multiple years of effort, it became easier. 
Two years after his discharge, Welsch went to the local police and 
reported the assault. Epidemiologists confirmed that the Sergeant was the 
source of the HIV infection for numerous of the men who had been assaulted. 
Local prosecutors in Pierce County Washington finally brought charges and the 
Sergeant pled guilty. 
But when asked whether he feels pleased that his assailant was criminally 
sentenced, Welsch responds, in his own words, with “an unequivocal, ‘no.’” 
Welsch explains that, in his view, what happened to him 
is the real result of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’: It created a situation 
where people could be assaulted and everyone was afraid to talk about 
it. . . . The assailant was an insane person. The assailant was in an 
environment that stigmatized him for being gay and stigmatized him 
for having HIV. Some people say [the assault] should just be blamed 
on him, it was his responsibility. That opinion doesn’t hold water with 
me. I think that the U.S. military through its absolute negligence 
created a monster. I hold them responsible. 
The repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not obviate the problem of 
sexual secrecy and shame in the military, because stigmatization of 
homosexuality persists and most of the military retains the ban on persons 
serving overseas who are HIV positive.282 Moreover, the resistance to taking 
 
282. See Katie Miller, Military Reverses Course on HIV+ People Serving Overseas, 
OUTSERVE MAG. (Nov. 19, 2012), http://outservemag.com/2012/11/military-reverses-course-on-hiv 
 1612 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  102:1553 
reporting out of the chain of command signals an institutional resistance to 
transparency and accountability when it comes to matters of sexual harm in the 
military. 
A certain further related measure of institutional prevention in the 
military, as well as schools, prisons, and churches may be accomplished simply 
by maintaining rigorous mechanisms for external institutional monitoring and 
auditing. Authorizing outside monitoring and auditing entities to carefully 
assess and routinely publicize reports on sexual harm would go a long way 
toward encouraging those institutions to address abuse responsibly. This would 
maintain strong pressure on institutions with reputational interests to preserve 
to take reasonable measures to prevent misconduct and address it promptly 
where it occurs. Relying on outside entities would undercut the tendencies 
toward cronyism that render internal monitoring currently in place often 
meaningless. Furthermore, rather than over-punishing particular individual 
perpetrators exclusively, the state ought to sanction meaningfully institutions 
for not addressing reported instances of sexual assault. 
External institutional monitoring and auditing of this sort is recommended 
by expert panels assembled to study pervasive sexual harm in both prison and 
educational environments.283 First, prisons: sexual violence in prisons in the 
United States is endemic and largely unaddressed. And sexual harm in U.S. 
carceral institutions presents an institutional and structural crisis that a social 
institutional reform framework may more substantially address than the current 
approach to regulating sexual harm. In 2008 alone, there were an estimated 
216,000 victims of sexual abuse in U.S. jails and prisons, according to DOJ: 
69,800 inmates suffered rape by force or threat of force; 36,100 were known to 
have suffered “nonconsensual sexual acts involving pressure,” for example, 
coerced by blackmail or as payment of a jailhouse “debt;” 65,700 had sex with 
staff “willingly,” which DOJ considers to be rape; 45,000 victims suffered 
“abusive sexual contact” such as unwanted touching of the inmate’s penis, 
vagina, breast, or buttocks “in a sexual way.”284 Yet, the internal grievance 
procedures in carceral institutions intended to address rape are notoriously 
inadequate. A 2007 survey of youth in custody by the Texas State Auditor’s 
Office found that “65 percent of juveniles surveyed thought the grievance 
 
-people-serving-overseas-2/ (explaining the Navy lifted its ban on HIV-positive sailors being stationed 
overseas in certain capacities, though most of the U.S. military still bans HIV-positive members from 
serving outside the country). 
283. See infra text accompanying notes 287–89 and 292–94. 
284. See Jill Filipovic, Is The US the Only Country Where More Men Are Raped Than 
Women?, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 
2012/feb/21/us-more-men-raped-than-women (reporting Justice Department’s estimates of prevalence 
of sexual abuse in U.S. penitentiaries) (citations omitted); Glazek, supra note 14 (“Crime has not fallen 
in the United States—it’s been shifted. . . . The statistics touting the country’s crime-reduction miracle, 
when juxtaposed with those documenting the quantity of rape and assault that takes place each year 
within the correctional system, are exposed as not merely a lie . . . but as the single most shameful lie 
in American life.”). 
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system [for reporting sexual harm] did not work.”285 
To address these and related conditions, consistent with this Essay’s 
argument, the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report 
recommends not only individual prosecutions, but external oversight, 
monitoring, and reporting as important preventive measures in addressing 
sexual abuse in prisons:286 
In particular, the Commission endorses the American Bar 
Association’s 2006 resolution urging Federal, State, and territorial 
governments to establish independent public entities to regularly 
monitor and report on the conditions in correctional facilities operating 
within their jurisdiction. Oversight by inspectors general, ombudsmen, 
legislative committees, or other bodies would work hand-in-hand with 
regular audits of the Commission’s standards.287 
The absence of external oversight and limits on the capacity of litigation to 
redress institutional complicity in sexual violence contributes significantly to 
the pervasiveness of sexual harm in carceral settings.288 External attention to 
those features of the institutional environment that enable such pervasive harm 
is crucial to addressing it. 
In the university setting, monitoring is intended to occur through the 
Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act, or the Clery Act.289 Under the supervision of the U.S. 
Department of Education, which has the authority to suspend financial aid 
eligibility or impose civil penalties in cases of noncompliance, this law requires 
all colleges and universities that participate in federal financial aid programs to 
maintain and relay information about crime on or adjacent to their campuses.290 
Clery Act enforcement and monitoring have proven insufficiently rigorous, 
however, to encourage robust action against sexual harm on college and 
university campuses.291 As in the military setting, a core problem in 
educational institutions is that monitoring and auditing are often internal rather 
than external. And external sanctions are seldom applied at the institutional 
level to address recurring incidents of campus rape or sexual harassment.292 But 
at a minimum, the Clery Act offers a framework for how more robust external 
monitoring or auditing might be conceived and implemented, providing for 
public reporting, access to other forms of data, and applications beyond 
 
285. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, REPORT 11 (2009), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf. 
286. See id. at 97. 
287. See id. at 10. 
288. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012) (federal legislation inter-
posing numerous barriers for prisoners seeking to access courts to challenge unconstitutional and 
otherwise unlawful conditions of confinement). 
289. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012). 
290. See id.; 34 C.F.R. § 668.46 (2014). 
291. See Cantalupo, supra note 272, at 244–52. 
292. See id. 
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colleges and universities to other social and educational institutions.293 
Beyond schools and universities, the military, and prisons, the family is 
the institution most beset by sexual secrecy, shame, and abuse, and least often 
subject to intervention of the criminal law. Norms of familial privacy protect 
certain important values, such as freedom from state interference in intimate 
relationships, though they also allow sexual abuse in the family to persist. 
Unlike in the military and schools where reporting mechanisms and 
accountability within these institutions themselves could substantially improve 
upon the current situation, it is less apparent how this could occur in the context 
of the family. Still, permitting more opportunities for exploration and 
discussion in elementary schools, in workplaces, and elsewhere of the issues of 
violence and abuse that persist in the family could begin to disrupt the silence 
around sexual harm in the home and shift the power dynamics—gendered and 
otherwise—that sustain sexual abuse in that context.294 Even violence within 
the family could be more meaningfully confronted if there were institutional 
spaces devoted to removing the stigma that prevents identification, self-help, 
and collective response. 
Of course, the reality is that these are all deep and difficult problems, ones 
the prevailing criminal regulatory framework addresses poorly. The 
institutional efforts described here—including those focused on the family— 
aim to disrupt secrecy and shame, however imperfectly, and to transform the 
interpersonal dynamics and institutional practices that enable sexual violence 
by reducing the harm to, and the silence and vulnerability of, those most 
impacted. But the possibility of ridding ourselves entirely of sexual harm only 
exists within the fantasy framework of banishing the scapegoat. Regulation of 
sexual harm instead ought to aim to understand with more specificity and depth 
how our central social institutions give rise to this violence and then try to 
make it a less prevalent feature of our collective social lives, as well as respond 
to those harmed in ways that might help them recover. The mechanisms 
 
293. In response to the sex abuse scandal at Penn State, the University’s trustees hired Louis 
Freeh to produce a report and recommendations as to how to better prevent and address sexual abuse at 
the school. Included in the Freeh report were 119 recommendations intended to prevent future 
incidents of sexual abuse. Some of the items include matters that bear directly on increasing external 
accountability and monitoring of the campus for problems associated with sexual abuse: in particular 
by completing external audits of Clery Act procedures and assigning oversight of Clery Act 
compliance to an individual in the Penn State police department, and allocating resources to permit 
that individual to satisfy the requirements of the Act. See FREEH, SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT 
OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY 137–
38 (2012). 
294. See, e.g., David Finkelhor, The Prevention of Childhood Sexual Abuse, FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN, Fall 2009, Vol. 19, no. 2, at 169, 180–81. (“An international meta-analysis found that 
children of all ages who had participated in an education program were six to seven times more likely 
to demonstrate protective behavior in simulated situations than children who had not. . . . Although 
researchers have conducted no experimental evaluations of whether educational programs prevent 
sexual abuse, they have provided a variety of supportive empirical findings so far.”). 
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explored in this section are all means of flattening unequal power relationships 
and promoting institutional accountability that could likewise address other 
forms of currently criminalized conduct absent the criminal law’s intervention. 
B. Infrastructural Preventive Strategies 
Institutional reporting and monitoring reforms may serve to disrupt 
secrecy and shame and empower vulnerable persons; investment in 
infrastructure development and increased natural visibility and publicity are 
also potentially significant means of preventing sexual harm.295 Examples of 
infrastructural preventive strategies include investment in design so as to 
increase natural visual transparency in spaces where incarcerated persons or 
young people interact with supervisory figures, as well as the construction and 
funding of shelters to enable persons at risk to leave the environment in which 
they are experiencing threat. 
Existing studies of underreported sexual harm, including of sexual 
violence in prisons, recognize the importance of infrastructure, natural 
surveillance, and design.296 According to the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission Report, in order to reduce the incidence of sexual assault in 
detention settings, correctional facilities must “assess[], at least annually, the 
need for and feasibility of incorporating additional monitoring equipment,” 
such as surveillance cameras and facility design.297 According to the report, 
“Technologies are not replacements for skilled and committed security officers, 
but they can greatly improve what . . . officers are able to accomplish.”298 
Natural visibility is also crucial in carceral and other institutional contexts 
because much abuse is tolerated, enabled, or even perpetrated by the persons in 
charge of monitoring or preventing sexual harm, such as prison guards. 
Consequently, ensuring that as much potentially harmful conduct is generally 
open to public view is critical to the prevention of such harm.299 
In one harrowing case of prison rape in Mississippi a twenty-three-year-
 
295. See, e.g., VERA LUCÍA VECENTINI ET AL., INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, PERU: 
METROPOLITAN LIMA URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (PTUL) - NORTH-SOUTH SUBSYSTEM: 
LOAN PROPOSAL 5, 13, 38 (2004), available at http://www.protransporte.gob.pe/pdf/info/publi2/PE 
-0187_e.pdf (proposing that improvements to citizen safety will be associated with improving public 
transport and street lighting); see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN 
CITIES (1961) (exploring how vibrant, flourishing communities are produced through public, multi-use 
urban spaces). 
296. See NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, supra note 285, at 61. 
297. See id. 
298. See id. at 60. 
299. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE REV. PANEL ON PRISON RAPE, REPORT ON SEXUAL 
VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS 7–8 (2012), available at http://ojp.gov/reviewpanel/pdfs/prea_ 
finalreport_2012.pdf (noting that facility design plays a significant role in maintaining low sexual 
assault incidence rates in jails and prisons); NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, 
PREVENTING VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN JAIL: A SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 
APPROACH (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412458-Preventing-Violence 
-and-Sexual-Assault-in-Jail.pdf (examining how increased visibility reduced sexual assault in jail). 
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old inmate wrote of being 
raped at East Mississippi Correctional Facility in Meridian Mississippi, 
MS by a gang member. I was beat brutally and faced several facial and 
rectum [sic] injuries from this attack. [Then,] I was raped, robbed and 
assaulted by several gang members. . . . I was held hostage due to this 
attack by these gang members in a cell. I was threatened with knives 
and tormented by these inmages [sic] for several hours. I was raped 
from 11:30 p.m. @ nite [sic] until 3:30 a.m. in the morning. . . . As he 
raped me continuously all I could do was cry because one false move 
and I knew this guy would take my life. . . . If I had one wish I would 
wish that I never violated the law and shoplifting which [was] what got 
me in prison.300 
This inmate’s account suggests that increased visibility of physical spaces 
in jail and prison could effectively prevent offenses of this sort in contexts 
where physical design features allow such abuse to continue by enabling 
obscurity and vulnerability.301 Further, the degree of over-crowding in facilities 
such that knives and other weapons move uncontrolled within the inmate 
population, as here, is brought about by incarcerating people convicted of 
minor offenses such as shoplifting. Reducing infrastructural problems, such as 
over-crowding and physical obscurity, would do much to address the problem 
of rape in prison.302 
This infrastructural preventive approach is explored in more general terms 
in Neal Kumar Katyal’s powerfully argued and provocative article, 
Architecture as Crime Control, in which he develops a theory of how design 
innovations might apply broadly as an alternative mechanism for conceiving of 
crime control.303 Katyal proposes: “Government is already making choices 
about crime through architecture when it builds housing projects, government 
offices, schools, embassies, and other buildings.”304 Moreover, 
[e]nforcement of rape laws can help avoid some stranger rape; but 
redesign of fire stairs, public spaces, and exterior lighting can prove far 
more effective (particularly given the reluctance of some victims to 
come forward). . . . Parent education and gun control might deter some 
crimes at schools, but changing schools’ physical layout to enhance 
 
300. Hamilton Nolan, The Story of One Prison Rape, In an Inmate’s Own Words, GAWKER 
(May 30, 2013), gawker.com/the-story-of-one-prison-rape-in-an-inmates-own-words-510475353. 
301. See LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 299, at 2 (“When surveyed after the new cameras were 
installed, fewer inmates believed that consensual and forced sexual activity were likely to occur 
compared with surveys of inmates conducted before the cameras were put in place. Violence was also 
perceived as less likely to occur, and a smaller percentage of inmates reported being threatened or 
getting involved in fights.”). 
302. See Stewart J. D’Alessio et al., The Effect of Conjugal Visitation on Sexual Violence in 
Prison, 38 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 13, 13 (2012) (finding states permitting conjugal visitation have 
significantly fewer instances of reported rape and other sexual offenses in their prisons). 
303. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture As Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1133 
(2002). 
304. See id.  
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visibility may deter many more.305 
Katyal’s analysis regarding architecture and design conceptualizes in these 
terms some of the further preventive potential of infrastructure development as 
applied to sexual harm. 
Also in this vein, investing in adequate shelters for persons fleeing abuse, 
whether children or adult spouses (with available meaningful wrap-around 
services) could potentially prevent future harm. This is true of even the most 
difficult-to-address family situations and functions without raising the concerns 
of individualized preventive approaches or drastic liberty intrusions.306 It is a 
form of prevention organized around empowerment of vulnerable persons. 
More generally, infrastructure and other community economic 
development initiatives that enable people to protect themselves hold 
considerable promise as preventive measures.307 Undoubtedly, investing in 
lighting, shelters, and facility redesign would be resource-intensive. But so too 
is the dysfunctional purportedly preventive criminal regime described in the 
foregoing pages, and this alternative preventive approach may promise more 
tangible long-term benefit. 
Other contexts where the criminal law currently serves as the primary 
mechanism for producing desired results—such as drug law enforcement—
could similarly be re-conceptualized in terms of infrastructure development and 
reduced reliance on criminalization and incarceration. One example of non-
criminal drug regulation along these lines is alternative livelihoods 
programming, which provides to persons involved in narco-sales and narco-
cultivation resources to shift to alternative means of self-support, whether 
through crop substitution or other alternative employment.308 
In the context both of regulating sexual harm and other forms of 
criminalized conduct, attention to infrastructure, increased visibility, and harm-
reductive design are ways to limit exposure to and risks of sexual and other 
harm. Although the precise quantum of prevention is unknown, these methods 
have significant preventive potential and should be incorporated, particularly 
because their potential benefits are clearer and their drawbacks less pronounced 
than some of the current purportedly preventive approaches associated with the 
prevailing post-conviction criminal sex offense regulatory regime.309 
 
305. Id. at 1138. 
306. See ELEANOR LYON ET AL., MEETING SURVIVORS’ NEEDS: A MULTI-STATE STUDY OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER EXPERIENCES iv (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/225025.pdf (“Respondents reported that if the shelter did not exist the consequences for 
them would be dire: homelessness[,] . . . continued abuse[,] or death.”). 
307. See id. 
308. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, supra note 47, at 162. 
309. See LA VIGNE ET AL, supra note 299, at 1 (“Fewer . . . opportunities to commit violence 
should translate into fewer offenses.”); D’Alessio et al., supra note 302. 
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C. Broadening Alternative Forms of Redress 
Another macro-level institutional preventive innovation, beyond the 
internal institutional context, would involve broadening the range of 
alternatives to conventional prosecution and incarceration, and narrowing the 
focus of conventional criminal law responses to sexual harm. The availability 
of other means of seeking redress in the aftermath of sexual harm beyond 
conventional prosecution and incarceration might encourage greater numbers of 
survivors to come forward. The conventional prosecutorial process frequently 
retraumatizes survivors of sexual violence, particularly when the perpetrator is 
someone with whom the victim has a close, personal relationship (as is often 
the case).310 Survivors may prefer more informal, less adversarial resolution.311 
In this regard, alternatives—whether restorative, mediation focused, or 
otherwise—might be conceived as a preventive innovation insofar as they may 
encourage a greater number of survivors of sexual violence to believe that 
meaningful recourse is available, making them more likely to come forward, 
and slightly shifting the balance of power in the situations where such harms 
transpire.312 Although it may seem counterintuitive that a more lenient, less 
formal process would encourage greater reporting and less violence, given that 
the most common sites of underreporting are in institutions to which we have 
strong emotional ties—churches, schools, the military—and involve intimate 
relationships, particularly within families, a less punitive alternative framework 
might produce increased reporting benefits and lead to greater deterrence of 
sexual harm.313 
In some relatively rare instances, conventional prosecution, incarceration 
or intensively supervised release may be at present the only available 
 
310. See Patricia Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the “Second Assault”: 
Legal Organizations’ Framing of Rape Victims, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 856 (1994) (“[W]omen 
whose cases were prosecuted were less well off psychologically six months after the rape than were 
those whose cases were not prosecuted, attributing this result to the effects of an adversarial legal 
system that subjects rape victims to challenge and duress.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Jamie 
O’Connell, Gambling With the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their 
Victims?, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 295, 334 (2005) (“Retraumatization may be more common in legal 
systems that uncover legally relevant facts through an adversarial, party-driven process, such as that of 
the United States.”). 
311. See Fan, supra note 28. 
312. These alternatives might entail recognizing the possible advantages (and disadvantages) 
of configuring a criminal process not on what John Griffiths called a “Battle Model” of criminal 
procedure characterized by antagonistic interests decades ago, but instead a “Family Model,” based on 
“reconcilable. . . interests,” even a “state of love.” See John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure 
or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J.. 359, 371 (1970).  
313. See JOAN TABACHNICK & ALISA KLEIN, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL 
ABUSERS, A REASONED APPROACH: RESHAPING SEX OFFENDER POLICY TO PREVENT CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (2011), available at http://www.atsa.com/sites/default/files/ppReasoned 
Approach.pdf (“If no hopeful, rehabilitative solutions are available and made publicly known, people 
who witness signs of risk for victimization and/or perpetration may be less motivated to take the steps 
necessary to prevent child sexual abuse, intervene in situations of risk, and seek help when a child is 
sexually abused.”). 
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reasonable response to a person who inflicts serious harm upon another person. 
However, the focus of such strategies ought to be dramatically narrowed and 
focused. This position is neither pro-defendant nor pro-victim or survivor. 
Rather, it is a matter of thoughtfully channeling resources so as to reduce the 
incidence of victimization and to permit procedurally appropriate, individually 
tailored responses to those relatively few defendants and convicted offenders 
who perpetrate serious harm against other persons and for whom there is no 
other appropriate alternative at present. The overbreadth and draconian quality 
of the prevailing criminal regulatory regime serves both survivors and 
defendants poorly. Even for the most egregious sexual offenses, incapacitation 
through incarceration may be a nonideal response, but we have yet to identify 
any manageable alternative314—non-carceral alternatives may become 
increasingly plausible as we broaden alternative forms of prevention and 
redress, if we are able to “creatively explor[e] new terrains of justice, where the 
prison no longer serves as our major anchor.”315 
D. Shifting Sexual Discourse 
A final preventive strategy in addressing sexual harm is to proliferate 
more understanding, institutional mapping, and frank and genuinely open 
discourse about sex, sexuality, pleasure, and harm.316 This would enable more 
informal and immediate response to risks of harm through discussion of 
potentially concerning situations with teachers, counselors, and family 
members, as well as within schools, prisons, churches, and especially 
families.317 
 
314. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 2, at 127–28. 
315. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 21 (2003); McLeod, supra note 46. 
316. But see MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 8 
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (exploring “the case of a society which has been loudly castigating itself 
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to relate in detail the things it does not say, denounces the powers it exercises, and promises to liberate 
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interactions. Foucault himself recognized that in the censorial discourse around sexuality, “[n]ot any 
less was said . . . on the contrary. But things were said in a different way; it was different people who 
said them, and from different points of view.” See id. at 27; see also Joseph J. Fischel, Sex and Harm 
in the Age of Consent 7 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file 
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unpleasant, or even harmful occurs in legally consensual relations. And some of the sex that occurs in 
legally non-consensual relations, between minors or between adults and minors, is formative, 
transformative, good, great, OK, or non-momentous. Perhaps more importantly, sex between minors 
and adults may in some instances be unjust whether or not the sex is wanted or consented to, in which 
case we, and the law, require another vocabulary for thinking sexual harm as meaning something other 
than consent’s violation.”). 
317. See, e.g., CHRISTIANE SANDERSON, THE SEDUCTION OF CHILDREN: EMPOWERING 
PARENTS AND TEACHERS TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (2004) (exploring 
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One of the significant but underappreciated barriers to reducing sexual 
abuse and violence is that some survivors are unable or unwilling to identify 
their experiences as such. Rather than simply a problem of under-reporting, 
certain youth subcultures normalize significant sexual harm, even rape. 
According to an analysis of forensic interviews with young women who had 
been sexually assaulted between 1995 and 2004, female youth routinely 
described “boys and men as natural sexual aggressors,” as “unable to control 
their sexual desires,” and assault was “often justified” in terms like these: “I 
never think it’s a big thing because they do it to everyone.”318 One young 
woman in the study justified assault in these terms: “They grab you, touch your 
butt and try to, like, touch you in the front . . . but it’s okay.”319 Another young 
female student reported nonchalantly that a man who rode on the bus to school 
with her “often threatened to come over to [her] house and rape [her].”320 She 
continued: “that can be a little weird to hear. . . . He tells me it all the time, like 
the last time I talked to him. . . . It’s just hard to, like, why would he say 
that?”321 Most young women interviewed reported they did not wish to make a 
“‘big deal’ out of their experiences.”322 The interviewees also report consenting 
to sex out of fear of rape: “I shouldn’t have been there, my mom said I 
should’ve been home anyway, but I didn’t want to get raped so I had to.” 323 
More open exploration of experiences of sex, sexuality, pleasure, and 
sexual harm would also allow for reconfigured power relations as well as 
incremental redesign of the relevant formal regulatory mechanisms in reference 
to more complete and accurate information about the scope of the problems at 
hand. In some instances, law may have a responsive role to play. But in other 
contexts—either where relationships are such that formal legal intervention is 
unwelcome or where sex may be consensual even if unwanted—shedding light 
on relevant harms may be a project in which criminal law does not figure at 
all.324 The possibility of reducing sexual violation and empowering those who 
would otherwise be sexually abused stands not only to decrease harm but also 
to increase the possibilities for all people to experience sexual pleasure and 
 
how engaging in frank discussion of childhood sexual abuse could be helpful to preventing such 
conduct). 
318. Heather R. Hlavka, Normalizing Sexual Violence: Young Women Account for 
Harassment and Abuse, 28 GENDER & SOC’Y 337, 344 (2014). 
319. See id. 
320. See id. at 345. 
321. See id.  
322. See id. at 347. 
323. See id.; see also Girls (Apatow Productions 2012) (HBO television series exploring 
young adult female sexuality, desire, and discomfort); Amanda Hess, Was That a Rape Scene in 
Girls?, SLATE (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/03/11/girls_adam_and 
_natalia_sexual_assault_and_verbal_consent_on_hbo_s_girls.html. 
324. See Robin West, Sex, Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 221 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2008) (arguing for more nuanced 
differentiation between non-consensual sex, consensual but unwanted harmful sex, consensual and 
unwanted but harmless sex, and consensual and desired sex). 
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sexual intimacy.325 This discursive project is by no means an easy or 
straightforward one. Much of what drives our moralistic, draconian, and 
irrational responses to sexual offending likely also informs our reluctance to 
engage in more transparent and honest sexual discourse and would likely color 
any associated more “open” discourse.326 Nonetheless, misinformation and 
incomplete information have in significant measure driven our dysfunctional 
responses to sexual harm; more accurate information, with more honest 
analysis of where sexual pleasures, risks, and harms lie, would enable better 
informed responses. 
CONCLUSION 
The profoundly dysfunctional criminal regulation of sexual harm in the 
United States, based on purportedly preventive but misguided grounds, 
excessively targets relatively innocuous misconduct, exaggerates rare forms of 
egregious threat perpetrated by dangerous strangers, irrationally and 
excessively punishes misconduct misperceived as more significant than it is, 
and largely overlooks the institutions and intimate relationships most plagued 
by sexual violence and abuse. This Essay has offered an account of how this 
pathological regime operates, why it persists despite its deep inadequacies, and 
how its excesses have been ratcheted down in several jurisdictions. But the 
problem of addressing sexual harm persists, especially in our central social 
institutions—schools, churches, prisons, the military—and between intimates in 
families. The supposed preventive focus of the prevailing criminal regulatory 
regime targets convicted sex offenders and does little to address these more 
pervasive problems. In a preliminary attempt to consider regulatory preventive 
alternatives that would respond to these more prevalent sexual harms, this 
Essay concludes by beginning to explore how we might conceive of regulating 
sexual (and other forms of interpersonal) harm as a macro-level, social 
institutional reform project: shifting institutional practices with regard to sexual 
abuse reporting and redress; facilitating the ease of confronting sexual 
misconduct, including through empowerment of vulnerable populations; 
concentrating on design and infrastructure development that would reduce risks 
of sexual harm; proliferating alternatives to conventional prosecution and 
punishment; and inviting more open understanding, mapping, and honest 
discourse about sex, sexuality, harm, and pleasure. 
  
 
325. See Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 
26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (1992). 
326. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 316. 
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